Between brotherhood and bureaucracy: Joseph Hudnut, Louis I. Kahn and the American Society of Planners and Architects

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This article details the formation and demise of the American Society of Planners and Architects, the first serious attempt to organize modern architects in the United States and a failed attempt to usurp the domain of planning from planners. The ASPA formed around Joseph Hudnut in 1943 as a vehicle for post-war planning and as an alternative to the American Institute of Architects, and dissolved in 1948 as the building boom made theoretical experiments in planning superfluous. The essay explains its failure in terms of shifting paradigms of professionalization in architecture.

Introduction

Shortly after World War II, Louis I. Kahn sketched out his ideas for ‘American Village’, a 1500-unit housing project intended to compete with speculative builders in the post-war housing market [1]. Kahn’s mock pamphlet presents a bit of a mystery: a project tinted with New Deal idealism, yet presented in a forthrightly promotional form and drawn up after the war, as the rise of the military–industrial complex led to what Alan Brinkley has called the ‘end of reform’ [2]. Post-war realities tripped a loud alarm on wartime dreams. A conservative ‘return to normality’, the emergence of Levitt-style mass housing and high levels of production and employment kept liberal reveries of social reform from lingering after the war. Why would Kahn – his partnership with Oscar Stonorov dissolving, newly appointed to teach at Yale University and with the first concussions of the building boom shaking his new solo practice to life – devote valuable time to a speculative venture with no client, no site and no funding?

Kahn created American Village for the American Society of Planners and Architects (ASPA, 1943–8), a short-lived group of progressive architects and planners founded in December 1943 in the spirit of the radical post-war planning that characterized the New

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Deal and the home front during World War II. Under the leadership of Joseph Hudnut, the dean of Harvard University’s Graduate School of Design, it attempted to become a centralized planning agency that would conduct research, disseminate information on planning, propagandize the importance of planning and create models for local planning efforts. It was also the first serious attempt in the USA to organize modern architects, who felt woefully under-represented by the American Institute of Architects (AIA). Eric Mendelsohn, Richard Neutra, George Howe, William Lescaze and William Wurster all joined, as did many architects in the younger generation, including Kahn, Philip Johnson and Eero Saarinen, and many urban planners, including Charles Abrams, Hans Blumenfeld, Henry Churchill, Edmund Bacon, Martin Wagner, Robert Mitchell, Jacob Crane and Catherine Bauer [3].

New Deal and post-war planning provided the context for the new group. The production methods of war and the promise of the building boom invigorated the building industry, changing its mentality, methods and scale of operation [4]. It was in this open field that Levitt laid out Levittown and the ASPA attempted to create American Village, a form of post-war housing inspired by the social responsibility of the Modern Movement and the idea of the neighbourhood unit pioneered by Clarence Perry [5]. Perry considered neighbourhood units to be the irreducible nuclei of planning, the ‘natural constituents of large urban aggregations’ [6]. Based on the Garden City idea, the neighbourhood unit organized self-contained areas based on the scale of primary schools, and girded them against the ‘raging streams of traffic’ that Perry deemed the great menace to cities [7]. The new society melted his idea and the Werkbund desire for the union of industry and high design into the overheated economic conditions of post-war America, recasting it in terms of planning. The group hoped to find support among manufacturers and financiers, using American Village as a promotional tool and as a research vehicle, exploring new materials and planning ideas. The project shows the glow of optimism that the war years cast on the New Deal, in particular the ideas and rhetoric of the National Resources Planning Board’s Action for Cities, one of the most important guides to urban planning published in the 1940s [8]. American Village was just that, an ‘action’, an attempt by a band of citizen-architects to provide a model of advanced neighbourhood planning.

Lost in the tumult of speculative building, American Village remained mere pencil marks in a file in Kahn’s office and the ASPA is a footnote in architectural history – it died in 1948. But the Society’s failure is tremendously revealing. In addition to being a working group of architect-planners, the ASPA also fashioned itself as a rebellion against the AIA. As late as the 1940s, the AIA remained an essentially conservative brotherhood of architects. Bureaucratically backward and only half-awake to the importance of the Modern Movement in architecture, the Institute cast a nineteenth-century ethos of organization over a twentieth-century profession. The upstart ASPA provided a considerable challenge, conscripting the advanced guard for its committees and organizing the group around the unfolding realities of architectural practice. Its members virtually jettisoned conventional ideas of architectural practice for planning. In other words, the first attempt to organize modern architects in the USA took the form of a planning group, a professional ‘land grab’ at which many planners balked. The history of the ASPA lays bare the tensions between architects and planners within the still nascent and protean field of planning. In the years after the war, the ASPA faltered as planners consolidated their position and the AIA became a more representative
Planning the post-war architect

In October, 1943, Joseph Hudnut published an optimistic elegy to the National Resources Planning Board, which earlier that month met its final fate at the hands of an increasingly conservative Congress bent on undermining the New Deal and fearful that planning of any sort led to totalitarianism:

Many people believe that the National Resources Planning Board died when a petulant Senate refused its annual appropriation. On the contrary, it was then that the NRPB came to life. From that time forth, the programs of this agency will live in politics – to win and lose elections, to make and unmake the careers of Senators – and in the end the NRPB in some form or other will be reconstructed. No doubt it will be given another name [9].

Two months later Hudnut agreed to preside over a fledgling group of modern architects who assembled in the middle of the war to forge alliances between what he called ‘the liberal wing’ of the profession and like-minded planners in order to plan for the post-war period. Their mission, while far from clear, was ambitious: to fill the lacuna left in the wake of the NRPB. The bureau had been the greatest hope for a centralized planning agency. It served as a clearinghouse for planning ideas and literature, published extensive volumes on all kinds of planning, from land use to regional planning and, during the war, it established planning programmes in several American cities. Its demise shocked an architectural community already reeling from ten years of depression and the effects of war. Clearly the ASPA could not supplant the old NRPB, but it received its impetus from its fall [10].

Likewise, the ASPA capitalized on the relatively weak organization of planners in the period. The depression created a great deal of instability for professional planners and their organizations. The economic crisis generated new thinking about centralized planning and New Deal agencies enlisted and nurtured an army of planners and administrators. At the same time, however, the economic realities of the moment forced cities to cut their planning budgets, leaving many planners without work and destabilizing the already shaky American City Planning Institute (ACPI) and the National Conference on City Planning (NCCP), as the flow of foundation support and dues slowed. The depression also changed the landscape of planning, challenging the élite core of practitioners with an influx of administrators from New Deal organizations. Three planning organizations developed out of this moment, a reorganized ACPI, the American Society of Planning Officials (ASPO) and the American Planning and Civic Association (APCA). The organizational diffusion was complete by 1934 and served professional planners in a moment of tremendous growth [11]. The war, more than the Depression, destabilized planning organizations, thinning their ranks, siphoning funds and recasting their role [12]. As Eugenie Ladner Birch has argued, in 1942 ‘an all time high of 1200 attended the National Conference as membership in the two associations reached about one thousand. Five universities offered degree programs, and there was a declared shortage of trained professionals’. Yet, that same year, Congress curtailed the NRPB and
began dismantling many other New Deal agencies that had a hand in planning. The American Institute of Planners, the descendant of the American City Planning Institute, was inactive during the war. The *Journal* of the Institute lapsed and annual meetings were cancelled until 1944. The new American Society of Planners and Architects came to life as war took its toll on these moribund organizations.

The first formal meeting of the ASPA took place in New York City in December 1943 and included Serge Chermayeff, Marcel Breuer, Mary Cooke, Vernon DeMars, Harwell Hamilton Harris, Carl Koch, Jr, A. Lawrence Kocher, Elizabeth and Rudolph Mock, Eero Saarinen, Jose Luis Sert, Oscar Stonorov, Hugh Stubbins, Jr, Henry Wright, and William Wurster [13]. Kahn, John Johansen and Carl Koch were also active members from the beginning. Almost all of the participants came to this meeting deeply involved with planning, having worked with New Deal agencies, or on wartime housing and planning [14]. All, moreover, would have been familiar with the earlier work of the Regional Planning Association of America, in particular its work on Radburn, which served as an important model for comprehensive planning in the 1930s and 1940s. The ASPA brought together the various wartime planning efforts and influences, but it also absorbed their motley and often conflicting agendas.

In addition to providing an umbrella for young, progressive architects and an alternative to the NRPB, it brought like-minded architects together with planners. European émigrés such as Walter Gropius, Martin Wagner, Marcel Breuer and Jose Luis Sert, joined established American architects like Wallace K. Harrison, George Howe and William Wurster, and younger architects like Louis Kahn, Hugh Stubbins and Eero Saarinen. To this were added some of the leading planners of the era, including Roland Wank, the architect of the TVA and of Greenhills, a Resettlement Administration new town in Ohio; Jacob Crane; Robert Mitchell, formerly of the NRPB; and some of its rising stars, G. Holmes Perkins and Edmund Bacon [15]. Editors Kenneth Stowell (*Architectural Record*), Kenneth Reid (*Pencil Points*) and Howard Myers (*Architectural Forum*) were invited to join, and their younger colleagues, George Nelson and Douglas Haskell, played an active role at various points in the group’s history. At its most ecumenical, the ASPA sheltered virtually every self-styled modernist architect and progressive planner on the East Coast. Members of CIAM, FAECT (a labour group for architects and technicians), architectural editors, educators, New Deal planners and social, economic and national planners were all brought into a larger collaboration. The amorphous society remained appropriately nameless at first, provisionally trying ‘Architectural Planning Group’, ‘Planning Associates’, ‘Society of Architects and Planners’, even ‘Telesis East’, before settling on the American Society of Architects and Planners [16]. ASAP, an acronym perfectly attuned to the spirit of the home front and the call for ‘action’, soon gave way to ASPA, which allowed the group to place planning before architecture, acknowledging the importance of planners, who were loathe to join a society of architects posing as planners.

Convincing Joseph Hudnut, the Dean of Harvard’s Graduate School of Design (GSD), to serve as President lent the group instant credibility. Architects widely admired Hudnut, not merely by dint of his position, but as a judicious administrator and eloquent spokesman for the profession and the Modern Movement [17]. His name alone attracted established architects to the group and his extensive correspondence with the membership shows his passionate interest, which went a long way towards binding the group together. But it was Hudnut’s commitment to planning and, in particular, his belief in the vital connections
between architecture and planning, that provided intellectual ballast for the group. In the early 1920s, Hudnut had learned from the German planner Werner Hegemann to think of architecture in terms of larger planning ideas and in 1936 he melded architecture and planning into a progressive pedagogy, uniting the disciplines in a single school, which he named the Graduate School of Design [18]. Planning was ubiquitous in the early 1940s, but Hudnut’s work at Harvard gave the ASPA its initial impetus and character. The Harvard Dean rapidly assembled a core group of young foot soldiers that included Chermayeff, Kahn, Stonorov, Saarinen, John Johansen, Stubbins, G. Holmes Perkins and Carl Koch [19].

As the ASPA found its identity, it advanced a mission that in its broadest outlines mirrored much of the work of the NRPB, with a bias for physical planning. The group emphasized research on specific urban problems, studies of specific cities, education through exhibitions, competitions and public relations. The interest in publicity reveals the tenor of the times. A savvy use of the media would be essential to the group’s survival during and after the war. PR, moreover, was then being debated in architectural circles, especially in the AIA [20]. The Institute clung to outdated ideals of professional conduct, which considered advertising anathema to professionalism. Architects were not allowed to advertise their services; instead, the AIA presumed buildings themselves spoke of the value of architects, following the standards of medicine and law. Public relations fit naturally into the ASPA’s programme and might be considered one of the defining elements of Modern Architecture in this period [21]. Architects already felt that the public failed to understand and value the role of the architect. Communication with the public would be even more important as the contentious and misunderstood planning displaced design.

At its core, however, the Society attempted to fill the void left after Congress dismantled the NRPB. Local chapters met with the intention of creating studies of local urban conditions. The group also set out to write a primer on planning similar to Action for Cities or Planning With You, an important pamphlet promoting planning ideas that Architectural Forum had just published [22]. A strong push emerged in favour of practical demonstrations, or what some members called ‘action’. Oscar Stonorov, for example, led a group in charge of ‘an ideal project for post-war building to provide for all the needs of a group of 10,000 families in an urban section’ [23]. Stillborn, like so many ASPA projects, Stonorov intended it to serve as a model for the advanced planning ideas of the group, much in the manner of the NRPB’s work in Salt Lake City, Tacoma and Corpus Christi [24]. Also in the spirit of the NRPB, the ASPA sought to establish connections with both public and private planning organizations [25]. Not surprisingly, they omitted the AIA, seeing the Institute as conservative and hopelessly entrenched in professional matters.

The call to membership

In April, 1944 Joseph Hudnut sent letters to 50 architects and planners, inviting them to join the new organization and asking for ‘an expression of opinion’ on the group [26]. The responses read like a referendum on architectural practice. Hudnut included a draft of the group’s constitution and a list of the proposed membership. The constitution went through multiple iterations and cannot be seen as the work of one writer, but Hudnut surely authored the first version [27]. ‘Architecture is a social art’, he began, ‘inseparable except in
rare instances from the collective life, the smallest unit of which is the family, the largest unit the city’. Quickly moving towards a view of comprehensive planning, the constitution continued:

We recognize, therefore, as the principal and proper concern of contemporary architecture – a term which for our purpose will include landscape architecture and city planning – the development of an environment for humanity more healthful and homogenous than any which has hitherto obtained.

Architecture’s task in this mission was the ‘shaping of theatres for living’ in the great cities through ‘collective endeavor’ with other sciences, ‘pooling our specific aptitudes and several funds of knowledge in projects mutually undertaken’ [28]. The message reflects the time spent during and after World War I with Werner Hegemann and it is possible that the conditions of World War II recalled the earlier association for the Harvard dean. In any case, in the early 1940s, Hudnut started using his regular column in *Architectural Record* to advance ideas on planning.

Even the initial response, which came from hand-picked members, was mixed. Eric Mendelsohn wrote:

May I say, quite frankly, that I would have preferred to see all progressive architects joining the A.I.A. in order to rejuvenate this established institution as regards to membership and spirit. All ‘palace-revolutions’ have been brought about by minorities. If, however, I am right in assuming that the decision to form a new society is based on your conviction that this is impracticable, the thing I would prefer – following my experience in many countries – is an advance guard bound together by conviction rather than by corporative rules. I hope that your authority will integrate at least the progressive splinter groups – Task, Telesis, and the new circle – into one impulsive force, which I shall be only too glad to join [29].

The new organization, on the other hand, troubled Philip Goodwin, the architect with Edward D. Stone of the Museum of Modern Art.

I seem to get more interested as time goes on in the gradual, halting transformation of our own American way of doing things than in international imported ways and ideas. They have served their purpose; we must not get another case of Beaux-Arts indigestion [30].

So much for the International Style. Goodwin would have seen names like Breuer, Chermayeff, Sert, Stonorov and a host of other non-Anglo Saxon names on the roster of participants. His xenophobia, an all-too-common expression of the times, shows just one of the impediments to forming an organization of modern architects in the USA. The ASPA, strongly flavoured with émigrés from Europe, was inescapably international. Hudnut, who frequently found himself mollifying disgruntled architects and planners, responded with candour and, perhaps, a touch of disingenuousness:

I share also your concern that the new Society may have an un-American flavor. No one seems to have noticed that the Beaux-Arts Institute was un-American although, in my opinion, it was intensely so; nevertheless, I do think that we should avoid, as you suggest, having another case of that kind. The young men who organized our Society were all Americans and we are not conscious of imitating any foreign organization [31].

Goodwin also expressed misgivings about the ASPA’s connections with Task, Telesis and FAECT, the last an organization within the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) with
strong ties to American Communism. The whole thing felt like a radical, foreign movement with dangerous political ideologies and, in spite of Hudnut’s remonstrations, Goodwin declined to join [32].

The ASPA also provided architects with an opportunity to condemn or poke fun at the AIA. Architect G. E. Kidder-Smith, an important promoter of modern architecture, eagerly accepted Hudnut’s invitation, writing that no group served the purpose of the ASPA, and added: ‘... I find myself frequently confounded and embarrassed by the attitudes, products and publications of [the AIA’s] members’ [33]. Likewise, Robert Allan Jacobs sent in his acceptance and wrote:

> One of the best commentaries on the A.I.A. at present, is shown up clearly in the April issue of the *Architectural Record* where it publishes the names, the faces, and the work of the leading figures in our representative organization, copies of which I am enclosing [34].

The work needed no commentary for Hudnut to get the point. Ranging from conventional to *retarditaire*, the mainly historicist projects and the accompanying mugs of the old guard were the *ancien régime* to their would-be ‘revolution’ [35] (Fig. 1). Hudnut responded:

> All the personnel, it seems to me, are practical men of affairs who would probably be somewhat impatient of any philosophic or, I may add, even intellectual factors in their practice. They are in the habit of getting things done, and they turn out the greatest amount of incoherent, contradictory and futile architecture without having the slightest notion of how preposterous it all is.

The uncharacteristically intemperate Hudnut ended on a more even keel:

> I felt that the modern architects of this country have been pretty consistently ignored and that their cause might be strengthened if they were to participate in some such organization as that which we have in mind. This is, however, a secondary objective and should not be permitted to hold the field against our other objectives, namely planning [36].

The new group, however, did provide an alternative to the AIA. If the diplomatic Hudnut denied this intention to some of his colleagues, the ASPA’s mission was less important to him than its role organizing modern architects in the USA [37]. He admitted as much to G. Holmes Perkins, writing to his younger confidant:

> The thing that I care most about in this whole business of the ASAP is this idea of organizing the liberal wing of our profession. We are not represented in the Institute of Architects and never will be, and the mere fact that we stand together in a society is in my opinion an aim which will justify our existence [38].

More than arousing a single line of dissent, however, the new organization brought out modern architecture’s conflicted relationship with the AIA. At the heart of Goodwin’s complaint (and Mendelsohn’s softer reservation) lay a certain feeling of loyalty to the Institute: ‘It is a clumsy organization’, Goodwin admitted to Hudnut, ‘much given to the organizational and club side, and not enough to the pursuit of the necessary reforms of the day. On the other hand’, he continued, ‘it is the professional organization and I do not believe in multiplying these as is often the American way’ [39]. Hudnut assured Goodwin that the ASPA was not meant as a rival to the AIA and, with more reserve than he showed Jacobs, wrote that:
Figure 1. Officers of the American Institute of Architects, 1944.
The Institute is essentially a trade guild, having as its objectives the interests and the promotion of our profession as a whole; and it must therefore include all types of opinion and could not assume a definite leadership in any intellectual movement. We ought all to support it heartily for the sake of our professional interests.

Clearly Hudnut could play both sides of the fence. ‘Our Society, on the other hand, will have as its objective the discussion of a definite phase of architecture and planning – namely, the relation of these to the structure of society’ [40].

William Wurster, Hudnut’s counterpart at MIT (and later at Berkeley) also expressed uneasiness about the ASPA’s intentions vis-à-vis the AIA:

I suppose, basically, what I am after is a revolution in the A.I.A., which shall gain for them the exact thing you are doing in the ASPA. Certainly, it would be ideal, if we could blast reaction out of the Institute, and make it a liberal, open, creative thing. I often wonder if perhaps the suggestion you made at one time (perhaps wrongly, as I recall), that a great group should resign from the Institute, as a general protest against its policies and procedure, but, the more I think of that, the more I do not like to pursue the road in this direction. For, after all, it is a going concern, nationally known, with a tremendous framework, which need not be duplicated. If I were not starting on a new job and were really politically minded, knowingly so, I should look into the Institute Charter, find how its officers are chosen, its committees formed, and then do some writing and traveling around the country to foment an honest revolution [41].

The aims of the ASPA were the aims of ‘a fine AIA’, Wurster concluded and, with that, declined being part of the administration. Hudnut disagreed on several points: ‘In the first place’, he responded

I don’t think there is any hope whatever of a reform in the Institute and it is utterly inconceivable that that organization should be a liberal or creative thing. That is true of the very nature of any organization which embraces so large a section of the profession. In the second place, I do not believe that the ASPA will ever become a rival of the Institute, nor should it be considered as a protest against its policies and procedures [42].

For Hudnut the AIA and modern architecture were fundamentally incompatible: ‘The liberals will never be represented in the Institute or even heard of there and it seems to me altogether proper that they should have their own platform’ [43].

At the time, however, the Institute failed not only to represent ‘the liberals’, but also the profession in general. Only one in five architects were members, far too few to create a quorum or the authority upon which a strong lobby group could be based [44]. Wurster’s concerns were those of the majority of architects who registered their disapproval by choosing not to join the Institute.

The ASPA had its own problems. Planners responded unenthusiastically. They saw the group as theoretical and, consequently, impractical, overly concerned with physical planning, the bailiwick of architects, and confused about planning. Roland Wank, a trained architect who practised primarily as a planner and who attended some of the preliminary meetings of the ASPA, offered Hudnut serious concerns about its character. The constitution appeared to be ‘half what its title implies and half a manifesto setting forth the objectives’ [45]. Of course, planners did not write manifestos; architects did. He also questioned its focus on cities and took the group to task for not thinking regionally
or in terms of rural planning. But his main problem centred on what planning meant to the ASPA:

As I recall the few meetings at which I was present, there was always some question as to who is a planner within the terms of the membership qualifications. Occasionally it was proposed that membership be restricted to physical planning, but many of those present, including myself, felt that physical planning is so closely interwoven with legal, economic, and other types that a planner who lowered his views to purely physical aspects would not be much above the level of a draftsman and should not, perhaps, qualify for admittance at all [46].

In spite of the fact that American society was then stretching planning’s meaning to breaking point, the framers of the constitution had failed to find a sufficiently broad definition and risked alienating actual planners. Hudnut wrote of collaboration and ‘shaping theaters for living’, but Wank still saw the strong bias towards architecture. A committed member of the ASPA, he remained active. Other planners would not.

G. Holmes Perkins, who was then working for the National Housing Agency, filtered additional criticism to Hudnut. Many planners, he wrote:

... felt that if the Society were to represent itself as one of architects and planners there should be more adequate representation in the membership. Most of us felt that before the January 20 meeting a determined effort should be made to invite progressive planners from among the economists, public administrators, industrial planners, sociologists and others who are actively engaged in planning. Without the inclusion of such men, we believe that the Society’s position will be distinctly weakened in the minds of professionals engaged in planning; that sound research cannot be undertaken without the aid of these planners; and that if this is to be avoided action must be taken prior to the elections [47].

By way of concession, the name officially changed to the ASPA, placing planners before architects, and a new constitution added the word planner every time the word architect was used. Planner Robert Kennedy provided a list of some 50 potential members in order to fortify the ranks with planners, dividing them into one group of economists, sociologists and planners, and a second group of ‘younger people who might make good members’ [48]. He stocked the first list with NRPB veterans and consultants, including Harvard economist Alvin Hansen, planners Hans Blumenfeld and Charles Ascher, and University of Chicago Sociologist Louis Wirth. The list also included other well-known planners like Tracy Augur, Roland Greeley and the head of the Philadelphia Housing Authority, Dorothy Schoell. Edmund Bacon, John Harkness, Robert Little and Huson Jackson made the second group. Hudnut crossed out some names (Edgar Hoover and political scientist Herbert Finer) and added others (Edward Barnes, László Moholy-Nagy, Peter Blake, Martin Wagner, Ezra Stoller, Herbert Bayer, Elizabeth Wood). Just a glance at this list shows how professional fissures could be social and philosophical, easily undermining a group’s cohesion. The planners, who were connected professionally through their past work in city, regional and national planning, must have been easy to spot next to the architects, who formed more of a ‘clubby’ clique based on shared commitments to modern architecture. Nevertheless, the ASPA leadership made a serious effort to bridge the gap, both through a second membership drive and by tailoring the group’s mission to a broader constituency that represented planners as well as architects. But creating a balanced membership, while important, was
superficial. The ASPA needed a plan of action to attract the planners and hold the attention of the architects.

Forging a plan for action

From the start, the group struggled to find a single compelling agenda. An early idea in 1944 to make a study of a housing project for a metropolitan area went nowhere. Chermayeff and Sert headed a committee to recommend a site. Chelsea, Harlem and Brooklyn were soon abandoned as unrealistic and the two architects instead put their weight behind the creation of a primer on planning ‘more popular even than Planning With You’ [49]. Such primers were mainstays of the home front. Affixing the ASPA to one would generate publicity. With this in mind, they wanted to publish the material one page at a time in PM, a magazine aimed at ‘production managers, art directors and their associates’, but little action came of it [50].

Some members wanted something more active than a pamphlet. Chermayeff proposed that 15 to 20 architects, living and working together for three weeks during the summer, work on a large neighbourhood planning project and Stonorov was asked to work out the possibilities of the group meeting in Philadelphia that summer. The group also began a small counter-offensive against real estate interests in D.C., which had begun to attack public housing through criticism of the National Capital Housing Authority. Vernon DeMars, John Johansen and Norman Fletcher, an architect with Gropius’s Architects Collaborative, had begun an exhibition for ‘counter propaganda’, a bit of earnest agitprop that also never went anywhere. All of this nibbling only brought out the discordant agendas of the group.

Collaboration proved fruitless and the group turned its attention to planning the first general meeting in January 1945. In the context of the home front, a lively meeting could take the place of action. Kahn was made chairman and DeMars and Saarinen formed a committee to work with him [51]. Kahn set about the task of crafting a coherent agenda for the rag-tag group, which he called an ‘outline plan of immediate action’ [52]. The first ‘ACTION’, as Kahn wrote it, was to affiliate with the leading planning organizations [53]. Secondly, the group would appoint representatives in New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C., who would report on the administration of their state, cities and towns. The only ‘action’ that required action, it consisted of studying and making reports about all towns with a population of 20 000 people or greater, gathering vital information on zoning laws and building codes, administrative and legislative bodies, planning commissions and housing agencies, citizens’ organizations, church groups and women’s clubs, a list he could have lifted from the NRPB’s Action for Cities. These studies formed the basis for the creation of local plans that would be ready when the war ended so that urban planning would follow consistent and progressive guidelines and could be absorbed into larger national planning efforts. Additionally, the representatives would keep files on local channels for propagandizing planning, ‘train local planners to regard the citizen as his client’, and conscript local architects into the group [54].

Holmes Perkins quickly did the maths, pencilling in the number of towns over 20 000 people in each state on his copy of Kahn’s report [55]. A group of 50 architects could scarcely be expected to make 149 reports on post-war planning. Hudnut concluded to Perkins:
My own feeling is that the program outlined by Kahn is very much too wide and that the
Society could not possibly undertake to do all the things which he outlines for us. He and I
had a long talk about it and he is going to bring in a more rational program for the consider-
ation of the group [56].

The only true ‘action’ was unrealistic. One wonders what they expected from Kahn, whose
best qualities did not include realism.

The rest of Kahn’s ‘actions’ amounted to a grab bag of sundry ideas, reinforcing the
perception that the ASPA had no central purpose. He promoted the study of national medi-
cal, labour, industrial, welfare and planning organizations, and the study of the relationship
of the group to other professional societies such as the American Institute of Planners and
the AIA. He suggested that the group study ‘a community or sub-town in a city analyzing
the relation of its neighbourhoods to a larger living area and its requirements’, including
problems in school and street safety, recreation, health needs, decentralization, shopping
and so on [57]. He revived the idea of a primer on planning and suggested the creation of
one intended for use in high schools [58]. With Perkins’s help, Kahn scaled back the report,
which became the basis for the first general meeting.

The first General Meeting

In January 1945, architects and planners assembled in the Perroquet Suite of the Waldorf-
Astoria Hotel in New York City to listen to an incongruous group of keynote speakers:
architect George Howe, planner Jacob Crane and Boris Shishkin of the AFL. Afterwards,
Philip Johnson hosted the group for a party. The three speeches show the Society grappling
to define the idea of planning and to understand the architect’s role in it.

George Howe, then with the Public Buildings Administration in Washington, D.C., read a
speech called ‘Master Plans for Master Politicians’, a rambling, pedantic and, at times, cyni-
cal discourse on the role of the ‘architect-planner as distinguished from the other planners’
in government work [59]. Planning, he wrote,

stands about where alchemy stood in the seventeenth century .... Even its operative symbol is
reminiscent. As elements of the ‘project’, the opus, we have first the ‘new material’, shall we
say material prima, and then its transmutation into social satisfaction and economic benefit,
shall we say the philosopher’s stone and liquid gold [60].

The link between alchemy and planning lay on the psychological level, as well. Citing Carl
Jung’s ‘The Idea of Redemption in Alchemy’, Howe wrote of ‘the struggle of the collective
unconscious to emerge into the light’, recalling Sigfried Giedion’s idea of the planner of the
future with his almost unconscious ability to sense the plan as if it were ‘velvet or emery
beneath his fingers’ [61]. Howe argued that, just as the alchemist had become an experimen-
tal chemist, so would the architect-planner become an experimental government planner,
but ‘that time has not yet come’ [62]. And yet, the architect-planner was no mere technician:
‘He differs from all other planners, political, social, economic, and legal, in one important
respect. He is, as the name architect-planner implies, more of an artist than any of the
others’ [63]. Howe subtly cleared space for a new sort of planner, technically savvy and able
to serve publicly, but endowed with a certain sensibility or creativity that other planners
lacked. He thus brandished the old model of the artist-architect, so often used by architects in the nineteenth century to trump engineers, to hew a space for architects in urban planning. The various planners who Perkins and Hudnut had worked so hard to include must not have been pleased.

Howe’s architect-planner was more than a technician touched with a tender soul. According to the old Beaux-Arts architect turned modernist, he was a moral creature amidst number-crunchers, and this made him both dangerous and necessary. Men in Washington distrusted architect-planners, Howe argued, because they were not deemed practical. Purely technical planners

have the further advantage in the eyes of the practical-minded that they do not raise difficult questions, questions of human values, questions of esthetics, all sorts of questions about things which, as the respectable citizens of Athens complained of the works of Pericles, ‘cost a world of money’. These questions it is the function and duty of architect-planners to raise [64].

As his proof, Howe brought in the evidence of what he considered to be the two great architect-planners of the twentieth century, Frank Lloyd Wright and Le Corbusier. The first ‘prophesies the abandonment or rurification of the city’ in Broadacre City and the second ‘prophesies its rebuilding’ in his plans for Paris. But their plans shared one great quality: ‘Their chief claim to fame is their splendid disregard for all practical impediments to their execution. They transcend the momentary limits of social, political, economic and legal possibility’ [65]. Wright and Le Corbusier in Howe’s mind were exemplary for being impractical, for asserting the moral force of their idea above petty matters of practicality. This idealist rant must have won applause from many of the architects, while the saltier planners shifted in their seats.

Howe’s point was a bit finer, however, than his overwrought prose suggests. In the face of administrative and legislative limitations, the architect-planner had to operate in the creative and moral space of politics, by which he meant something akin to Daniel Burnham’s famous line ‘make no small plans:’ ‘... a bold plan dramatically presented is one of the most powerful instruments of political pressure in the hands of any section of society’, Howe wrote [66]. Plans were politics by other means, forays into ‘the realm of the political imagination’, a form of argument and, in the end, a form of persuasion [67]. Other planners ‘can work out the details of legislation and administration’, but

only he can provide the statesman with graphic projections of the still impossible leading to imaginative political action that will set the machinery moving. Whatever else he does, this he must continue to do. He must provide master plans for master politicians [68].

Howe essentially made an appeal for planning as a humanistic and visual pursuit – as opposed to a purely technical one – and proposed the architect as its chief protagonist and, importantly, propagandist. Of course, it was just this sort of planning that most government agencies had no time for, but that the NRPB had begun to grasp as an essential part of democratic planning. The public had to be convinced of the moral necessity of planning and moved to take part in it.

In contrast to Howe, the AFL’s Boris Shishkin and Jacob Crane, representing the ‘technical planners’, delivered uninspired speeches. Shishkin had no time for art. He understood planning in terms of national planning, as a means of attaining full employment, which was
then an important topic of debate as the USA began to make preparations for demobilization and reconversion [69]. With millions of unemployed veterans returning from the service and the artificial stimulus of the war no longer driving the economy, a wide constituency favoured public spending for full employment as a temporary measure to stave off post-war depression. With this in mind, Shishkin placed labour at the Marxist base of planning, stringing together pre-war employment statistics for steel workers and playing them off of housing statistics to show that the average worker had no chance at a decent home. Architects and planners, he claimed, had not faced the economic facts of labour and he applauded them for making the first step by inviting him to speak, but more had to be done: ‘No matter what we say, no matter what we attempt to do, we will be completely remote from reality and completely in the clouds until we tie our work in the planning of our cities to employment and income’ [70]. Perhaps he had George Howe’s sort of planner in mind. Likewise, when Howe casually wrote that other planners ‘can work out the details’, he was thinking of Shishkin’s technical planner.

Jacob Crane presented a report on ‘Urbanism in England’ [71]. The British, he wrote, had achieved a much greater degree of consensus than the Americans, putting the placement and control of industry at the heart of planning. Touching quickly on a broad range of planning issues from population density and green space, to migration, decentralization, housing and community centres, Crane argued that the Americans trailed the British in their general philosophy of planning. The British National Treasury was prepared to underwrite the acquisition and development of land, while the USA had just dismantled the primary agency that recommended a similar measure. In the end, all three speakers acted as boosters for their particular slice of planning and none of them provided a vision of how they might work together. Were the ASPA to find common ground for its diverse constituencies, it would have to come from another source.

The meeting also occasioned the first opportunity for a vote on new leadership. Hudnut expected to step down as the president of the society, but he was a bit uneasy about the democratic process. In a letter to Serge Chermayeff, who headed the Nominating Committee, he made a number of ‘recommendations’. ‘In the first place’, he began, ‘I think it is highly important that the President of the Society should be a practicing architect and not a professorish person or a critic’ [72]. At first blush, this was a self-effacing comment by the ‘professorish’ Hudnut, who also recommended, with Goodwin’s criticism in mind, that the nominees be American. Hudnut named Vernon De Mars, Harwell Hamilton Harris, Wallace Harrison, Louis Kahn, Oscar Stonorov, Hugh Stubbins, Jr, Henry Wright and Eero Saarinen as possible names for the ballot. For Vice President he thought a writer or professor would be appropriate, adding ‘and, not to be unbecomingly modest, I should feel honoured to take that position’ [73]. His real concern, however, lay elsewhere. Confiding in Chermayeff, he wrote:

I have been a little bit disturbed by the fact that we have two women officers – one as Secretary and one as Treasurer [74]. I am not, as you know, an anti-feminist but I think the coloration of the Society would be improved if we elected either one of these officers by replacing one with a practicing architect of the opposite sex [75].

In fact, Hudnut remained President through 1946, while not a single woman remained in a position of administrative power after this meeting [76]. The ‘liberal wing’ of the profession
recapitulated the ‘old boys network’, systematically excluding women from participation by fixing the electoral process.

‘The project crowd’

The scattered meeting was not good for morale. The Society rapidly split into two groups, those interested in study, theory and discussion, and those interested in practical demonstrations and projects. A similar split had plagued professional planning organizations for decades [77]. While the two groups overlapped with one another, the split signified a fundamental philosophical and professional division between those who would join the group merely out of sympathy with its larger aims, regardless of their role, and what Joseph Hudnut rather ruefully called ‘the project crowd’ [78]. Roland Wank delivered the most devastating critique in the wake of the meeting. He wrote to Hudnut:

I believe that enough research is being done on planning now and it is almost impossible for anyone engaged in active work to maintain familiarity with the many publications that are issued in a good many quarters; nor does a ‘vocabulary’ seem important enough to warrant the expenditure of time and energy. I don’t believe that many of the difficulties in the way of planned action could be ascribed to misunderstandings about the meaning of words, nor do I think that such misunderstandings as may occur would be eliminated by the publication of their authentic interpretation. Such looseness of terms as exists will eventually work itself out as planning gradually comes of age and active projects require exact understandings and methods of handling [79].

The ambiguities of planning were to be expected. As a relatively new practice composed of many distinct but interwoven strands, planning, Wank believed, would eventually acquire precise definition. Furthermore, he saw no point in co-ordinating material on planning and thought that Breuer’s idea for planning a theoretical project capable of realization was ‘a contradiction in terms’:

Since the project is no doubt intended for our existing framework of business and political relationships, it could hardly be successfully carried out without an actual sponsor with actual financing behind him. There are too many problems of land acquisition, financing, action by governing bodies of cities and counties, on which assumptions would have to be made unless the project were in earnest. Such assumptions made in a vacuum might have little relevance to actual circumstances that would develop in the course of a real project [80].

He supported the idea of a planning project with a real sponsor, but doubted whether members would have the time to work seriously on such a project. A real planner doubted the ability of the ASPA to accomplish anything remotely like real planning.

José Luis Sert agreed with Wank: ‘... I think he is right in some respects. I believe that A.S.P.A. ought to do something more than talk and discuss this problematic project idea which, anyhow, cannot take shape immediately no matter how active the project committee may be’ [81]. Shaken, Hudnut turned to MIT professor John Burchard:

There is on the one hand a group of members who wish to restrict the membership to persons able to participate in the projects of the Society. They want only workers and are inclined to
resist the expansion of the Society to persons who have only an intellectual interest in architecture but who perhaps are unable to give any time to the active work of the Society [82].

Other members, however, wanted a national organization to represent those ‘who are genuinely in sympathy with modern planning and architecture’. This had been Hudnut’s dream from the start, an organization for modern architects in the USA, but a vocal minority, mostly composed of modern architects themselves, stood in the way. ‘There is an extraordinarily large number of persons’, Hudnut wrote, ‘who would like to join but who have been excluded because the persons whom I may call the “project crowd” have a majority on the Executive Committee’ [83]. Burchard agreed: ‘I myself would plump for a livelier society in which the critics were present and so as a generalization I would not favor the attitude of the “project crowd”’ [84]. In the midst of this storm, Hudnut and the newly appointed Secretary, Hugh Stubbins, sent out a new round of invitations. A well-chosen membership would determine the mission.

Rowing a sinking ship

Stubbins’ new call for membership swelled the ranks with both young and internationally known architects, making it appear from the outside just like Hudnut wanted: an American society of modern architects [85]. I. M. Pei, Richard Neutra, Frederick Kiesler, George Fred Keck, Henry-Russell Hitchcock, Sigfried Giedion and Walter Kurt Behrendt all joined. Planners proved harder to convince. In fact, some of the leading planners of the day did not see the point of the new organization. Unlike the underemployed architects, they were too busy and were well represented by other organizations. Frederick J. Adams wrote to Hudnut that he was not convinced that the ASPA did not duplicate the work of other planning organizations [86]. Adams was the founder and long-time chair of Department of Urban Studies and Planning at MIT and a close colleague of Hudnut’s. To have him decline was a blow to the prestige and the chances of the group. Tracy B. Augur, one of the leading planners of the day, also declined to join, but on the grounds that the new society ‘closely parallel those of other organizations with which I am already affiliated, and any further dispersion of my interests would only weaken my limited participation in their work without making any real contribution to yours’ [87]. Busy planners had little time for the professional posturing of architects.

The problem of defining a mission and amassing a diverse membership was really part of the larger problem of defining architecture and planning as overlapping fields. Even before the first meeting, William Wurster had put his finger on the dilemma. He told Hudnut that he thought it ‘unfortunate that the word “planner” is included in the name of the organization and I wonder if it is too late to remedy what I conceive to be a tactical error’ [88]. Wurster’s criticism penetrated beyond issues of institutional loyalty. The very nature of planning, to the extent that the ASPA defined it, had little to do with architectural practice. ‘There is, of course, the broad meaning of planner’, Wurster wrote, ‘which forms a proper base for inclusion of such, but it has come to mean a profession, and the question might well be raised – why not “architects, planners, and economists” or “architects, planners, and sociologists”? ’ [89]. Indeed, the literature on planning urged precisely
this sort of collaboration. If planning truly were to be collaborative, how would the ASPA find a core membership? Or worse, how would it serve modern architects and these other ‘planners’, as well? Wurster saw through the exaggerated claims of wartime planning and named it: ‘It seems as if we architects are too eager to climb on the bandwagon of “planning”. It has that same tinge as colored the formation of “industrial designers”’ [90]. He worried over uprooting the profession for what could turn out to be a fad and he questioned the propriety of trespassing on professional turf. Both could be disastrous, the one lulling architects away from the mainline of practice and the other throwing them into competition with planners instead of establishing grounds for collaboration. As the end of the war approached, reality began to win out over idealism. A serious gulf between architects and planners was impossible to ignore. Moreover, the ambiguity of planning impeded the ASPA’s ability to forge a platform of action. Even leading modern architects like Wurster balked at the group’s intentions.

With the end of the war, the ASPA lost its one great asset, the luxury of anticipation. Architects had been out of work. The home front had provided a kind of pause in professional practice, loosening up routines and encouraging the speculation of planning. With that gone, the group foundered on arrival in the post-war period. Only Harvard faculty showed up to the December 1945 meeting. Suddenly, the academics were the only ones with time. For the first time, Hudnut’s faith faltered: ‘I must say frankly that I am very greatly concerned over this matter. I am, as you know, no promoter and could not possibly succeed in building up any wide interest in the Society by my own efforts’ [91].

In 1946 key members began to resign, including the noted architect and planner Henry S. Churchill, who rued ‘the split between the “planners” and the architects’ [92]. Churchill complained that ideological agendas ‘were uppermost in the minds of many’ [93]. The ASPA had failed to make a place for itself. ‘There is a place for a small organization of like-thinking individuals, whose force stems from the unanimity of their attack’ and ‘there is a place for a large organization that will act as a sorely needed clearing-house for ideas and opinions … A.S.P.A. has filled neither of these functions’ [94]. Of greater concern, some of the stalwart younger members questioned the group’s integrity. John Johansen, for instance, wrote to Hudnut: ‘the members may not be willing to continue the Association for another year with the same poor record of accomplishment’ [95]. Deeper problems plagued the group, as well. With the war over, Johansen wrote, ‘architects are too busy with their separate pursuits to devote much energy to projects of or sponsored by the Association’ [96]. Employment created apathy and, in lieu of a clear role in the post-war context, promoting the cause of progressive architecture and planning seemed an insufficient reason for the group’s existence. The ASPA cancelled its annual meeting in 1946, further evidence of the group’s deterioration. Ironically, the problem with the ASPA, a group meant to co-ordinate the various strands of planning into one synthesis, was ‘the piecemeal, unsystematic result of any attempt to bring together busy, and scattered, members on a basis of voluntary and temporary contributions’ [97]. The same problem plagued the AIA, which also operated on a voluntary basis and struggled to rouse its membership to action. Architects had simply not created a viable bureaucracy for themselves.

In a last gasp attempt to keep the group alive, Louis Kahn took the helm in 1947 [98]. The charismatic Kahn kept members in the fold and he drafted an ambitious plan of action for an architectural ‘super group’. Carl Koch balked at the idea, proposing instead a ‘super
secretary’ [99]. More criticism of Kahn’s idea came directly to Hudnut. One architect objected strenuously:

I would be thoroughly in favor of a proposal to create a new association if ASPA were a living and kicking organization. Considering however the continuing embryonic state of our society I can hardly conceive of how it can join a new super organization before having given proof of its own existence. It seems to me therefore that the proposal is but another phase in the chameleonlike career of liberal technical groups: A pyramiding of dead bodies. No purpose can be served by such action [100].

Kahn was not deterred. He and others forged ahead with American Village, the final attempt at an ‘Action’ [101].

The ASPA, even without Kahn’s megalomania, was a quixotic venture from the start. Were it merely a ‘palace revolution’ in the AIA, it would still seem overly idealistic. Yet this was its greatest attribute, the faith in the ideals of the Modern Movement after years of depression and war. What, after all, did the ASPA hope to achieve? The AIA, in spite of its meager membership, already had a monopoly on most of the institutional arrangements of architecture and building. It enjoyed a vital partnership with the Producers’ Council, a national organization of manufacturers. (This relationship deserves more scholarly attention.) The Institute also provided important technical information on products through Theodore Coe’s Technical Department. It created a system of filing manufacturers’ pamphlets, which was indispensable in an economy of constantly proliferating products. It administered competitions and placed a permanent representative in D.C. to lobby on behalf of the profession. A major drive for membership in the AIA just after the war secured its financial future and gave it resounding support from the nation’s architects, including modernists, who would soon dominate the AIA Gold Medal awards. By 1948, the ASPA had no reason to live.

The importance of failure

In spite of its failure, the history of the ASPA is vital to an understanding of modern architecture in the USA. The new society was nothing less than an attempt to bind the many strands of architectural modernism together in the USA and to recast them explicitly in terms of planning. It proved impossible to weave the threads into an integral fibre, even with the waning of the institutional power of the Beaux-Arts, the fragile organization of US planning and a weak AIA standing on the sidelines. American modernists and the European émigrés among them, lacked the vocabulary to define themselves in the 1940s. A phrase like ‘liberal wing’ distinguished the ASPA from the more conservative AIA, but it shows a rhetorical groping. Hudnut, a skilful and careful purveyor of words, surely intended ‘liberal wing’ to be inclusive, a way of embracing the many ill-defined camps that it was his charge to unify. Yet, the term shows the ambiguity of what modern architecture meant in the mid-1940s, revealing the need to pull back to uncontested rhetorical ground. To speak of the ‘liberal wing’ of the profession carried a vague political connotation without resorting to contentious political terms, but it also could be understood in terms of cultural identity, an association with modern forms and ideas roughly synonymous with the word ‘progressive’,
another common term in the ASPA correspondence. The problem of naming, even the naming of the group itself, betrayed the frayed hem of the Modern Movement. The absolute discretion also shows an awareness of the political realities of the moment, when a jittery, conservative Congress turned against the New Deal, and soon would turn from Germany to the Soviet Union as the main threat to US interests [102].

The moderate rhetoric began to articulate the terms of a rapprochement with big business. Corporate culture rapidly assimilated modern architecture after the war in part because modern architects began plying a palatable language. There were good reasons for temperance. After more than a decade of depression and the dormancy of war, work trumped ideology. The Atlantic Ocean and the temporal gap of depression and war had given American architects a measure of distance from the Modern Movement, which many of them had encountered from a distance in the first place. From the apprehensive hiatus of wartime unemployment, the movements of the 1920s and 1930s bunched up into something resembling a history. Sigfried Giedion traced it in *Space Time and Architecture*, going so far as to call it a ‘new tradition’ in his subtitle. Paul Zucker employed equally vague language, dubbing it ‘The New Architecture and City Planning’ [103]. The tradition of modern architecture, long before reduced to a ‘style’ by Hitchcock and Johnson in their International Style exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art, and now sanctioned with its new historical pedigree, was ripe for appropriation [104]. By the early 1940s, corporations also enjoyed a different relationship to modern architecture. After the 1939 New York World’s Fair, major US corporations associated themselves with the ‘world of tomorrow’, the fair’s theme, and did so through architecture.

In this light, the corporate co-option of modernism, often seen in pejorative terms, should be revised. Architects had hungered for an effective and grand public relations campaign for the profession for more than a generation. This hunger grew acute during the war and led to serious changes in policy in the AIA. Architects for the first time feasted on advertising, enjoying the bounty of Madison Avenue and using advertising pages as a forum for advanced architectural ideas [105]. Many ASPA members were involved in advertising efforts, including H. H. Harris, Saarinen, Wurster, Kahn and Lescaze, marrying the Modern Movement’s search for a socially meaningful architecture with ideals of corporate social responsibility. In other words, while Kahn led an ideologically vigorous agenda for action in the ASPA, he simultaneously created ads and pamphlets that rehearsed the same issues. Modern architecture and corporate patronage became entirely consistent, self-reinforcing activities, a resolution that professional planning organizations had yet to achieve, in part because the architectural product – buildings – are more easily imagined within the context of consumer culture and marketing than are cities, which require much more complicated networks of investment and marketing. Such collaboration promised an alliance between architects and industry that updated the old Werkbund venture by enlisting manufacturers to finance their work and to foster a new ethos about planning. The ASPA began to imagine the design of cities in light of the design of goods, an elaboration that shows how far the Modern Movement had come from its Arts and Crafts origins [106]. Another advance had nothing to do with design, but with the maturation of public relations as a field in the 1930s. Kahn’s ‘American Village’ pamphlet, like all of his ‘actions’, married these forces together, incorporating public relations into the constellation of fields under the control of the master builder.
The emphasis on public relations demonstrates the burgeoning realization in architecture that its future hinged on the power of language to shape public perception of the field. Design alone was impotent. Architecture required a language of persuasion in a moment of sophisticated, elaborate advertising campaigns and grand geo-political ideological battles. In this regard, it is no wonder that modernism betrays, or perhaps even ran on, anxiety, as Sarah Goldhagen, Réjean Legault and others have observed [107]. William Graebner’s description of the 1940s as an ‘age of doubt’ certainly had its architectural analogue, although the claim is perhaps too general to be useful [108]. The ASPA shows the sources of post-war architectural anxiety. This doubt, as much as it may have been about design, the role of tradition and so forth, sprang mostly out of larger institutional and cultural forces that put the architect at an increasing disadvantage next to engineers, builders, industrial designers, planners and corporations. The ASPA hoped to stem this institutional and professional crisis by creating the ‘master planner’, who would subsume the competition as the master builder subsumed the various crafts.

The society, however, was a polyglot group, speaking with a range of accents in a babble of related but often irreconcilable languages and cants. Bound imperfectly by the negative mission of creating an alternative to the AIA, the culture of modernism proved less stable than the doddering, but steady culture of the establishment. The AIA, with its ‘old boys network’, WASP aristocracy and strong pockets of anti-modernist sentiment, simply did not represent the profession in the mid-1940s. But its culture, in spite of bureaucratic weakness, was stronger than the ASPA and it emerged from World War II more powerful than it ever had been.

The significance of ASPA

Failure is often more revealing than success because in hindsight the latter tends to look inevitable, while failure raises the flag over instability. Much of the interest of the ASPA comes from the view it gives into the institutional structure of architectural practice. The architectural profession in the 1940s was caught between paradigms of professionalization that were defined on the one hand by its more successful and mature cousins, law and medicine, and on the other hand by shifts in consumer culture that challenged much of the foundation of the disinterested authority of expertise in architecture [109]. The common refrain that architecture operates as an ‘old boys network’ is really a comment about the structure of authority in the profession. Such networks of prerogative emerged out of the conditions of nineteenth-century urban culture, in particular the associations, historical societies, library companies and clubs that fostered mutual exchange between learned gentlemen [110]. A more formal institutional framework began to mature in the twentieth century, based in the university and in professional associations – as opposed to intellectual associations. The AIA took root during the reign of the first paradigm, as a club and, essentially, a men’s club. The character of the early AIA lay somewhere between an association of mechanics like the Philadelphia Carpenters Company and a learned society with vague professional ambitions, but before professional ideals in architecture were clear or had the institutional support of universities and a system of national accreditation [111]. Over the next century architects would build much of this institutional infrastructure.
even in the 1940s, the AIA floated in the still water between tides. The romance of the old gentleman’s club enjoyed by a nineteenth-century urban cultural élite marked the culture of US architects deep into the twentieth century, long after mature models of professionalization had been richly articulated.

One of the major cultural dilemmas for architecture in the mid-nineteenth century, when the AIA formed, was straightforward, if nettlesome – it was also one of the central questions for cultural élites in the same period: How does a group find cohesion in a society of strangers? The professional dilemma added a wrinkle to the question: How does a group of strangers bound by a common practice establish its authority in a quickly nationalizing economy of consumers and impersonal corporations? Even in the mid-twentieth century, architecture had still not found a persuasive and abiding answer to that question, nor had it created the internal means to assert, regulate and publicize that authority. Of course, within most cities, architects cultivated clients in their own community or social group. The anonymity of mass society in cities spawned what Thomas Bender has referred to as ‘closed social cells’ and, for architects, these could be tremendously important circles for commissions and for building a reputation. But beyond these groups, architecture had not secured for itself the authority of medicine or law because it had failed to construct the national institutional framework out of which an anonymous authority could grow. For doctors this entailed a tight nexus between universities, hospitals and credentialing, with the American Medical Association presiding over it and acting as the font of public relations. The legislation that brought doctors a monopoly over medical practice, abolishing mountebanks and other health providers, gave that nexus a national profile and granted it the external authority of the government.

By contrast, architects established their academic perch relatively late and the nexus surrounding it proved comparatively fragile. The architectural firm, for instance, pales before the role of the hospital, and the AIA shrank from its bureaucratic role of power broker, lobby group and proselytizer until the post-war decades. Instead of the AIA, other commercial forces stepped in to assume some of these roles. Sweet’s Catalogue and Dodge Reports came to supply important information on new products, building codes and forecasting, at the same time taming and regulating the flow of architectural and building information and knowledge. Instead of a forceful journal as the mouthpiece of the profession, architecture had a shifting number of commercial architectural magazines, the Octagon and later the Journal of the AIA least among them. Instead of a single professional body that could pull the influence and dues of all architects and harmonize them into one voice as a lobby group and supply concerted public relations, architects splintered into state and local societies, while the AIA struggled until after World War II to consolidate its membership on a national scale. Some of this failure must have to do with the very nature of architectural practice, its double life in art and technique, in affairs cultural and matters practical, but some of it stems from a simple inability to perceive or respond to the changing social structure and the place of architecture within society – the partial blindness caused by an old paradigm blocking the new one from full view. Planners, by contrast, had an even later start and, owing to the diversity of early education, training and professional accreditation, they had a more oblique purchase on organization.

The ASPA insinuated itself into this context. The Society forged a new path, free of some of the burdens of the old architectural paradigm and more developed than anything
offered by the ASPO or the AIP. Its members, for instance, understood the value of public relations and pursued it unflinchingly, as a natural part of practice, not as a threat to credibility. And the vision for a grand institution embracing all of the planning professions, with architecture at the centre, while flawed in many ways, was well-suited to the facts of building and design during the New Deal and war. Design came after politics and public relations. Vast government agencies and corporations had become the largest architectural clients, planning immense projects in which the individual design of buildings was often coordinated with regional and even national planning. No organization existed to represent these new conditions and the ASPA seized the opportunity. But aspects of the old ‘men’s society’ remained, most prominently the exclusion of women and a parochial, intimate mode of organization that was radically out of touch with modern bureaucracy. By the late 1940s, the ASPA had even lost its relevance as a forum for modernists alienated by the AIA. The Institute, after its post-war drive to consolidate its membership, came to represent the field in a much broader way [114], causing the changes in bureaucratic structure that led it to outgrow the old Octagon House, built in 1800 by Dr William Thornton, the gentleman-architect. The AIA finished its present corporate headquarters in 1973, designed by the Architects Collaborative, the model of anonymous design established by Walter Gropius just after the war (Fig. 2). The old gentleman’s club is now nestled nostalgically in the courtyard of architectural bureaucracy.

Figure 2. Headquarters of the American Institute of Architects (photograph by author).
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Notes and references


3. For Kahn, the ASPA extended his Architectural Research Group (ARG), an architectural Klatsch he founded in 1931, where the young talent in Philadelphia gathered around the charismatic young Kahn to hear him hold forth on Modern Architecture. D. B. Brownlee and D. G. De Long. *op. cit.* [1], p. 25.


7. Ibid., pp. 30–1.

8. Public Administration Service, *Action for Cities*. Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1943. We know that Kahn was familiar with the NRPB guide because he built a panel for a 1945 French exhibition on American housing that he called ‘Action for Cities’. The very word ‘action’ deserves attention as a keyword in modern architecture. For another later example, see the pamphlet put out by The American Council to Improve Our Neighborhoods (ACTION), a group composed of Walter Gropius, J. L. Sert, Carl Koch, B. Kenneth Johnstone and planner Martin Meyerson: *East Hills, a Demonstration of Better Living* (Cambridge, Mass.: ACTION, 1959). ACTION was primarily a Pittsburgh group, but it had its roots with Meyerson in Chicago.


13. Earlier informal meetings had already been held for several months. In a letter Hudnut wrote to Philip Goodwin (May 18, 1944), he explained that he was invited to join only after two meetings. See Harvard University. Graduate School of Design, Records of Office of the Dean, 1894–1980, Subseries X: Records of the External Offices and Organizations, in folder ‘ASPA-Membership Correspondence-Individuals re: Joining’, UAV 322.7, Box 5, XB, Harvard University Archives (hereafter cited as ASPA Papers).

14. Harris and Sert belonged to CIAM, which disbanded during the war and must have provided the ASPA with its emphasis on planning. See Eric Mumford, *The CIAM Discourse on Urbanism, 1928–1960*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000. CIAM, with Sert as the writer, had just published *Can Our Cities Survive*, a scathing indictment of the modern city and a prescription for its survival. See José Luis Sert, *Can Our Cities Survive?: An ABC of Urban Problems, Their Analysis, Their Solutions*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942. Stonorov worked with the former head of the Urban Section of the NRPB, Robert Mitchell, to set up a local planning institute in Philadelphia. See Oscar Stonorov to Joseph Hudnut (April 9, 1945), in folder ‘ASAP-General Correspondence’, ASPA Papers, Box 5, XB. Henry Wright, the son of the well-known planner and an architect in his own right, worked as managing editor at *Architectural Forum*, the Luce publication that had turned its pages into a propaganda machine for planning. See, for example, Syracuse Tackles Its Future. *Fortune* 27 (May 1943) 120–3, 158, 160, 162; City Planning: Battle of the Approach. *Fortune* 28 (November 1943) 164–8, 224, 226, 228, 230, 234; and So You’re Going to Plan a City. *Fortune* 29 (January 1944) [122]–5, 172, 174, 177, 178, 180, 183.

15. Perkins provides the most important line of connection between professional planning and architecture organizations. Associated closely with Gropius and Hudnut at Harvard, he was a key figure in the ASPA and later served as the editor of the *Planners’ Journal* from 1950 to 1952.

16. The group got permission to use the name Telesis East, but decided not to use it. See Minutes of the Meeting, May 6, 1944, in folder ‘ASPA: Notebook Assembled by GHP, 1943–45’, G. Holmes Perkins Collection, Architectural Archives of the University of Pennsylvania (hereafter cited as Perkins Collection).


19. Following the first meeting, an Executive Committee met regularly and larger annual meetings took place beginning in January 1945, with local chapters in Washington, Philadelphia, New York and Boston cities meeting on their own.
20. The AIA was just beginning to take public relations seriously during the war and would undertake its first major collective campaign for the profession in the immediate post-war years. This first PR campaign of the AIA deserves more attention.

21. Of course, architects like Royal Barry Wills, who did not consider themselves Modernists, also embraced public relations techniques, but the Modern Movement’s ties with publicity emerge out of two key characteristics of the movement. Its close ties with industry, beginning with the Werkbund, made publicity less a distasteful act of self-promotion than a programmatic part of design. Also, the deep faith in the role architecture could play in improving society has important affinities with the ways in which advertisers enlist faith as a tool for selling. In some cases, advertisers expressed a sincere faith in their project, Bruce Barton going so far as to liken himself to Jesus Christ. See Leo P. Ribuffo, Jesus Christ as Business Statesman: Bruce Barton and the Selling of Corporate Capitalism. *American Quarterly* 33 (Fall, 1981) 206–31.

22. The ASPA thought about collaborating with the CIO on a planning primer. Simon Breines, a member of FAECT and of the ASPA, had been given funds by the Education Committee of the AIA to write a similar pamphlet, which suggested a collaboration. Elizabeth Mock considered having the ASPA write one for the Museum of Modern Art, which was considering a pamphlet called ‘Look at Your Neighborhood’. Minutes of the April 1, 1944 Meeting of the ASPA, in folder ‘ASAP Minutes [1944–1945]’, Box 4, ASPA Papers. Planning With You, *Architectural Forum* 79 (August 1943).


24. Tacoma Looks Forward. *American City* 58 (September 1943) 53–5; *Pencil Points* also reported on their general effort in: Genesis of the NRPB Demonstrations. *Pencil Points* 24 (August 1943) 32–3.

25. These groups included the American Society of Planning Officials, CIAM, the National Committee of Housing Officials, the National Committee on Housing, the National Planning Association, the National Public Housing Conference, Inc., state and local planning bodies, the American Medical Association, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the Committee on Economic Development, the Foreign Economic Administration, and the Building Industry Committee of the National Council of American–Soviet Friendship (NCASF), many of whose members joined the ASPA. Members of both the ASPA and this last group included Simon Breines, Serge Chermayeff, Jules Korchein, Morris Sanders, Henry S. Churchill, Vernon DeMars, Joseph Hudnut, Roland A. Wank and William W. Wurster.


27. G. Holmes Perkins wrote ‘Dean Hudnut’s Statement’ above a typescript that is almost verbatim the same as the constitution. See folder ‘ASPA: Notebook Assembled by GHP, 1943–45’, Perkins Collection.


29. Eric Mendelsohn to Joseph Hudnut (May 3, 1944), in folder ‘ASPA-Membership Correspondence-Individuals re: Joining’, Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers.

30. Philip Goodwin to Joseph Hudnut (May 5, 1944), in folder ‘ASPA-Membership Correspondence-Individuals re: Joining’, Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers.

31. Joseph Hudnut to Philip Goodwin (May 12, 1944), Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers. Hudnut may have been referring obliquely to CIAM, as well.
32. Philip Goodwin to Joseph Hudnut (May 15, 1944) and Hudnut to Goodwin (May 18, 1944), Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers.
33. G. E. Kidder-Smith to Hudnut (May 5, 1944), in folder ‘ASPA-Membership Correspondence-Individuals re: Joining’, Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers.
34. Robert Allan Jacobs to Joseph Hudnut (May 10, 1944), Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers.
36. Joseph Hudnut to Robert Allan Jacobs (May 12, 1944) 1–2, in folder ‘ASPA-Membership Correspondence-Individuals re: Joining’, Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers.
37. The animus against the AIA continued in later appeals for membership, as well. Robert Cerny, a Harvard-trained architect who had worked for Roland Wank on the TVA wrote in 1945:

> ... I might say quite frankly that although I am a member and past director of the local chapter of the American Institute of Architects I find them typically stodgy and inactive. I fear they resent my rather futile attempts to stimulate planning activities by the Chapter group.

Robert G. Cerny to Hugh Stubbins (May 23, 1945), in folder ‘ASPA-Secretary-Stubbins-Mock 1944–45’, Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers.
39. Philip Goodwin to Joseph Hudnut (May 5, 1944), in folder Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers.
40. Hudnut to Goodwin (May 12, 1944), *op. cit.* [13].
41. William Wurster to Joseph Hudnut (March 15, 1945), in folder ‘ASPA Membership Committee 1944–46’, Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers.
44. This statistic was a commonly cited figure in the early 1940s. The actual figures are more firmly established in Turpin C. Bannister (ed.), *The Architect at Mid-Century: Evolution and Achievement*. New York: Reinhold Publishing Corporation, 1955. See, especially, p. 73. By 1950, membership had reached 44% of all registered architects.
45. Roland A. Wank to Joseph Hudnut (May 8, 1944), in folder ‘ASPA Membership Committee 1944–46’, Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers.
47. Letter G. Holmes Perkins to Mrs C. Paul O’Connell (November 18, 1944), in folder ‘External Relations, Committee for 1944 ASPA’, Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers.
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(of the Department of Agriculture), Willard Day (of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) and Holmes Perkins.

53. These included the American Society of Planning Officials (ASPO), CIAM, the National Committee of Housing Officials (NAHO), the National Committee on Housing (NCH), the National Planning Association (NPA) and the National Public Housing Conference, Inc. ‘Report Submitted by Mr. Kahn’, ibid., p. 1.

54. Ibid., p. 3.

55. Ibid.

56. Joseph Hudnut to G. Holmes Perkins (November 27, 1944), in folder ‘External Relations, Committee for 1944 ASPA’, Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers.

57. ‘Report Submitted by Mr. Kahn’, op. cit. [55], p. 5.

58. Ibid.

59. George Howe, ‘Master Plans for Master Politicians’, p. 1. Typescript, in folder ‘ASPA-Publicity’, Box 15, Series X, ASPA Papers. This was later published under the same title in Magazine of Art 39 (February 1946) 66–8.

60. Ibid., p. 1.


62. G. Howe, ibid...

63. Ibid., p. 2.

64. Ibid., p. 3.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., p. 4.

67. Ibid., p. 5.

68. Ibid.


70. Ibid., p. 3.


73. Ibid.

74. Elizabeth Mock served as Secretary. See folder ‘ASPA-Secretary-Subbins-Mock 1944–1945, Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers. Janet O’Connell may have served in some official capacity, as well.

75. Ibid. Female members included: Mary Cooke [Barnes], Catherine Bauer, Mary Goldwater, Alice Carson Hiscock, Victorine Homsey, Elizabeth Mock, Dorothy Schoell Montgomery, Janet O’Connell.

76. George Howe served as Vice President; Hugh Stubbins, Jr was Secretary and Treasurer; and the Executive Committee included: Chermayeff, Gropius, Sert, Perkins, Roland Wank and John Burchard. See folder 13, Box 26, Douglas Haskell Papers, Avery Architectural and Fine Arts Library, Columbia University.

77. E. L. Birch, op. cit. [11] 26. Birch details how the American City Planning Institute suffered from identity problems in the 1920s and 1930s. Thomas Adams favoured a ‘gate-keeping’ organization with a technical base overseeing entrance into the profession. Others advocated a wider view of planning that would allow a more diverse body of practitioners, administrators and allied professionals to join, even at the cost of losing its power to register and qualify planners, to oversee education and to administer a code of ethics.
78. Joseph Hudnut to John Burchard (October 17, 1945), in folder ‘ASAP-General Correspondence’, Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers.
79. Roland A. Wank to Joseph Hudnut (April 10, 1945), in folder ‘ASPA-Secretary-Stubbins-Mock 1944–45’, Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers.
80. Ibid.
81. José Luis Sert to Joseph Hudnut (May 15, 1945), in folder ‘Project Committee ASPA [1944–45]’, Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers.
82. Joseph Hudnut to John E. Burchard (October 17, 1945), in folder ‘ASAP-General Correspondence’, Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers.
83. Ibid.
84. John E. Burchard to Joseph Hudnut (October 18, 1945), in folder ‘ASAP-General Correspondence’, Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers.
85. Form letter from Hugh A. Stubbins, Jr (March 24, 1945), in folder, ‘ASPA-Publicity 1944–46’, Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers.
86. Frederick J. Adams to Joseph Hudnut (January 16, 1945), in folder ‘ASPA-Membership Correspondence-Individuals re: Joining’, Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers.
87. Tracy B. Augur to Joseph Hudnut (December 10, 1945), in folder ‘ASPA-Membership Correspondence-Individuals re: Joining’, Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers.
88. William Wurster to Joseph Hudnut (January 25, 1945), in folder ‘External Relations, Committee for 1944 ASPA’, Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. Joseph Hudnut to Clark Foreman (December 17, 1945), p. 2, in folder ‘Executive Committee Meetings ASPA 1944–46’, Temp Box for UAV 322.7 (Box 4), ASPA Papers.
92. Henry S. Churchill to Joseph Hudnut (January 4, 1946), in folder ‘ASPA-Membership Correspondence-Individuals re: Joining’, Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. John Johansen to Joseph Hudnut (January 7, 1946), in folder ‘ASAP-General Correspondence’, Box 5, XB, ASPA Papers.
96. Ibid.
97. ‘Report to the Executive by a Sub-Committee on the Annual General Meeting’, in folder ‘Proposed Annual Meeting 1946 (not held)’, Box: Temp Box for UAV 322.7 (Box 4), ASPA Papers.
98. Minutes of the meeting called by the sub-committee of the Executive Board of ASPA (11/23/46).
99. Carl Koch to G. Holmes Perkins (12/13/46), in folder ‘Executive Committee Meetings ASPA 1944–46’, Box: Temp Box for UAV 322.7 (Box 4), ASPA Papers.
100. Letter to Joseph Hudnut (December 13, 1946), in folder ‘Executive Committee Meetings ASPA 1944–46’, Box: Temp Box for UAV 322.7 (Box 4), ASPA Papers. The signature on the letter is illegible, but it was written on Harvard Club stationery from New York City, and the author was also a member of CIAM, making Christopher Tunnard a possibility. Tunnard was active in MARS (the British CIAM group), the ASPA and he had taught at Harvard before joining the war effort.
101. Even in 1948, Kahn proudly put ASPA on his letterhead next to AIA.
102. A. Brinkley, op. cit. [2].
106. The comparison is a bit unfair, since C. R. Ashbee wrote *Where the Great City Stands: a Study in the New Civics* (London: The Essex House Press, 1917), which easily could have been a model for modernist interest in planning.
110. The outline of this argument depends on Thomas Bender, *The Erosion of Public Culture: Cities, Discourses, and Professional Disciplines*, in T. L. Haskell (ed.), *ibid.*, p. 86.
112. T. Bender, *op. cit.* [113], p. 89.