Breaking the Taboo

Architects and Advertising in Depression and War

For much of the history of the architectural profession in the United States, architects faced censure if they advertised their services, despite the fact that they required intimate knowledge of and deep immersion in the commercial world. Going back to the tradition of the gentleman-architect, the very definition of an architect’s professionalism depended on rising above the “low” world of commerce. By the twentieth century, the American Institute of Architects (AIA) began to erect safeguards against competition among individual architects. Following codes of conduct that had been forged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by the emerging professions, the Institute favored a policy in which reputation, as opposed to self-promotion, was the invisible hand directing architectural practice.

But already in 1918 architects began to question this aversion to advertising their services. One architect described the reality of modern advertising:

Every architect probably sleeps on an advertised mattress, bathes every morning with an advertised soap, uses an advertised tooth paste on an advertised tooth brush, puts on an advertised suit of clothes, eats an advertised breakfast food and starts to his day’s work, after putting on an advertised hat and coat. Thereupon he sets out on his daily tasks. He must strenuously avoid everything that savors of advertising the measure of his own ability or else risk the wrath of the governing body of his profession. Is this consistent?

The writer revealed the absurdity of ignoring the realities of the consumer culture that had been developing in the United States since the 1880s. After all, by 1918 packaged brand-name goods were rapidly displacing local products, while mass advertising in magazines with hundreds of thousands of readers were creating regional markets and transforming citizens into consumers. Accordingly, advertising would be hotly debated within the AIA for the next thirty years as architects tested the increasingly murky divide between editorial content and advertising in architectural magazines. The dire economic conditions of the Great Depression would try the Institute’s resolve around these issues and reawaken an interest in a broad public relations campaign for the entire profession as an alternative to individual advertising. By the beginning of the Second World War, architects were thrown into a new relationship with advertising that compelled the AIA to liberalize its policy.

A division between advertising and publicity dated back to the first sustained attempts to create publicity for the profession on the eve of the United States’ entry into the First World War in 1916, when D. Knickerbacker Boyd, a Philadelphia architect, started the AIA’s Committee on Public...
Information—“public information” was the forebear of public relations as a genre of publicity. As a term, “public information” allowed the Institute to ease the concern that advertising might “place [the architect] in the ranks of the ‘fakir,’” as one editorial posed the problem in 1918. Boyd later explained that he had used “public information” because it was “a safe term” that referred to “the promulgation of authentic facts or the giving out of news,” as opposed to “publicity,” which “has little place in the vernacular of the profession.” The AIA also may have sought to evoke the gravity of wartime information by echoing the name of the National Committee on Public Information, which acted as the official propaganda arm of the war. The Institute carefully nurtured this distinction in its early forays into publicity, inoculating itself against charges of unsavory commercial practices by presenting its publicity as news rather than as advertising. Public information would continue to be the prevailing way architects approached publicity until the 1940s. William Harmon Beers, who chaired the AIA Committee on Public Information in 1930, wrote: “News is never manufactured nor hectically unearthed by appeals for written articles.” Advertising, on the other hand, was invented, and therefore of dubious value because it inevitably called into question one’s veracity; the point of public contact with the profession, the AIA maintained, should not be a fiction.

In 1918 the AIA hired publicist James T. Grady instead of turning to the established world of advertising. Grady, a journalism professor at Columbia University who doubled as its publicist, also took that role for the American Engineering Council and the American Chemical Society. Grady believed that legitimate news made the best publicity because it transformed the natural good work of architects into newsworthy items. But his job was essentially passive: he urged local chapters to send in their noteworthy activities, which he vetted and sent to newspapers and magazines. He also encouraged exhibitions and other activities that would place architects’ work before the public, but the result was a random offering of dinners and speeches that paled before the truly aggressive public relations efforts of the day. Drawing on the rigorous standards of professional credibility in journalism, Grady also supplied architects with the rhetoric they needed to publicize their work without contradicting their code of ethics. Like architects, engineers had framed professional publicity in terms of public information, but they interpreted publicity more broadly and pursued it assertively. In 1921 the American Association of Engineers (AAE), the counterpart to the AIA, convened the First National Conference on Public Information in Chicago, publishing the results as *Publicity Methods for Engineers*. The frontispiece of the book shows how engineers wrestled with the relationship between publicity, professional ethics, and rational standards of practice (Figure 1). Beneath a rendering of a pier of the Delaware River Bridge (now called the Benjamin Franklin Bridge), the creed of public information is reduced to a formula: “Policies + Personnel = Publicity.” The atmospheric worm’s-eye view of the bridge between Philadelphia and Camden, however, had little to do with policies and personnel. The longest suspension bridge in the world when it was finished five years later in 1926, it was one of the engineering marvels of the day, making it an obvious project to use in a publicity campaign. By the 1920s bridges had been playing this role for decades.
model, in which water spills out of the conduit, revealing the infrastructure (Figure 2)\textsuperscript{14}

Engineers quickly moved beyond this didactic formula of public information toward unapologetic acceptance of modern advertising. The 1921 conference offered an unusually liberal definition of public information.\textsuperscript{15} Engineers were told that news was “anything that interests the people,” including “motion pictures, posters, advertisements,” even gossip.\textsuperscript{16} As architects nervously worried over sullying themselves with salesmanship, engineers were being handed matter-of-fact instructions on how to create successful advertising campaigns. “It must be remembered,” wrote the AAE, “that the backbone of all successful public information work is well-handled advertising space in magazines and newspapers.”\textsuperscript{17} The AAE fully condoned collective publicity, praising the Advertising and Publicity Service Bureau for Electrical Engineers, whose organization chart resembled that of a large bureaucracy (Figure 3). Below the chart lay the publicity goals of the electrical engineers. The field of public relations was made to seem as rational as the organizations that used it.

Calling the AIA’s prohibition of advertising “drastic,” Frederick Haynes Newell, a former president of the AAE, wrote in 1922 that engineers found it impracticable “to follow the architects in their declaration that it is unprofessional to advertise.” Civil engineers, he wrote, “make the prohibition not against advertising but against carrying advertising to the point of self-laudation.”\textsuperscript{18} As for publicity, which was still inseparable from public information, Philadelphia engineer Morris Llewellyn Cooke argued the same year that “the greatest safeguard in the development of a proper procedure for the enforcement of ethical conduct is publicity . . . . absolute publicity must be our goal.”\textsuperscript{19} Only slightly more sober was the Code of Practice that the American Society of Civil Engineers adopted in 1927, and that would remain in effect through the 1950s. The ASCE encouraged publicity of the “standards, aims, and progress” of the profession, which borrowed its language from the AIA’s code.\textsuperscript{20} But the ASCE explicitly allowed the engineer to engage in outright advertising, so long as it kept to the “lines of work in which he has had experience, and [the] responsible positions which he has held.”\textsuperscript{21}
In that same year, 1927, the AIA formalized its own, more stringent, policy on advertising. The key line echoed that of the engineers: “An architect will not advertise for the purpose of self-laudatory publicity.” But the code left little gray area for the sort of indirect promotion that architects often received from having their work published in national magazines. The architect, the code continued, “will not take part or give any assistance in obtaining advertising or other support toward meeting the expense of any publication illustrating his work.” While the Institute intended the rule to curb architects’ souvenir sketchbooks and other promotional activities, it also included promotional materials published by the building industry and monographs and magazines supported by advertising.

This put architects at a disadvantage in the building industries: engineers and most of architecture’s cognate professions had evolved in order to thrive in a modern consumer culture. Builders and contractors, free of prohibitions against advertising, promoted their practicality and thrift, openly antagonizing architects by advertising that they could do the same job minus the fees for design. Industrial designers effortlessly melded design and public relations, while engineers enjoyed the fruits of positive publicity—not of their own making, including the work of Thorstein Veblen, the economist and sociologist who heralded them as the leaders of a new society after the First World War. Architects had to investigate new models of professional practice.

The cult of the engineer had even invaded architects’ views of their profession. In the nineteenth century and much of the twentieth, architects had used art as a bastion against the encroachment of engineers and builders. A comparison of Otto Wagner and Le Corbusier’s views on the engineer strips away the veil of artistry: Otto Wagner’s seminal book Modern Architecture (1896) struck out against engineers and builders, or, in his words, “hermaphrodites of art and vampires of practice.” Beret of artistic talent, the engineers, as Wagner’s colorful language suggested, had an infertile, if not perverse, relationship to architecture. In his typically nineteenth-century view, the Viennese architect wielded art to defend architecture against the engineer, the fundamental threat to practice in the nineteenth century.

By 1923 Le Corbusier had reversed the terms. He lionized the great anonymous engineers, holding up their bridges, grain silos, and other structures as an inspiration for modern architecture. In Towards a New Architecture, he wrote: “Our engineers are healthy and virile, active and useful, balanced and happy in their work.” Architects, on the other hand, were “peevish” and, as a result, they were “unemployed.” He called the architectural schools “hot-houses where blue hortensias and green chrysanthemums are forced, and where unclean orchids are cultivated.” The architect, a devotee of aestheticism, was now the pervert, and the noble-savage engineer the hero. Where Wagner had waged war against the engineer, Le Corbusier joined ranks with the former enemy, appropriating his traits for the architect.

The role of the architect had been in transition for decades in the United States, but by the teens architects framed the identity crisis explicitly in terms of publicity. “The architect to-day occupies a rather hazy position in the estimation of the community,” wrote George W. Maher in 1918. A leading Prairie School architect in Chicago, Maher culminated a round of debate in the architectural press about architecture and advertising. “His qualifications are very indistinctly comprehended by the rank and file of the people, his real status perhaps being associated with that of an artist, a dreamer, who is not to a great extent acquainted with the practical affairs of life. . . . He therefore is . . . simply a picture maker of houses and structures.” Behind this reputation lurked a more significant challenge: “the engineer, and also the general contractor, are given the distinction of being the real builders, admittedly so by the fact that their advertising signs are displayed conspicuously at buildings during construction.” The author proposed an official system for “signing” buildings with the architect’s name, but beyond that he held firm to the ban on advertising.

As much as anything, Maher was responding to the nationalization of the American economy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which had placed architects in the midst of ever more intricate and expanding anonymous business relationships. By the 1930s, as government agencies and competing professions encroached upon their territory, architects in private practice awakened to the need for a public relations campaign for the entire profession, a grand re-packaging of the architect that would preempt the need for individual promotion. Architects in this period would have witnessed the birth and dissemination of this relatively new field. The New Deal thrived on public relations techniques, selling politically fractious ideas with savvy and spin. Advertisers, who saw government agencies appropriate business tactics for programs that undercut their corporate clients, responded aggressively, inventing rhetorical strategies to sell the American public on the leadership of big business in lifting the nation out of the Depression.

Architects were slow to respond to these changes, in part because they lacked a clear sense of their role. Before World War II, the architect—whether understood as artist, designer, master builder, manager, planner, or, more frequently, some combination of all of these—had not been clearly assimilated with the consumer culture. As the consumer culture evolved in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and...
professions were formalized, American architects repeatedly played with their image.

The quandary about professional identity was rooted in the shifting role of the architect in corporate capitalism. By 1900, the growth of immensely large corporations was giving birth to a new class of managerial elite that displaced familial structures of business organization. The expanding class of managers and professionals sought signature architecture for their houses, businesses, foundations, government administrations, and universities. Simultaneously, as clients, this same managerial elite buoyed an older, craft-based tradition of architecture, even as their own modern business practices undermined that tradition. Yet these same clients, as members of an increasingly secular managerial class, found themselves the first class of disenfranchised elites. While they grew powerful in their own spheres, few of them could “aspire to become their own bosses” in the expanding bureaucracies of business, government, and service. The “crisis of cultural authority,” as historian T. J. Jackson Lears called the dilemma, amounted to the displacement of the old “Protestant work ethic” by a cosmology based on the power that inhered to material goods.

In this time of cultural consternation, the new professional-managerial corps appeared with a timely dual message. On the one hand, they proposed a new efficiency, an improved regime of administration by experts. On the other hand, they preached a new morality that subordinated the old goal of transcendence to ideals of self-fulfillment and immediate gratification. This late-nineteenth-century link between individual hedonism and bureaucratic organization . . . marks the point of departure for modern American consumer culture.

Architects served this class—and they belonged to it. By the 1930s, as the Depression intensified the strain on the old model of the artist-architect, they turned away from both the artist and engineer and adopted a more managerial and organizational model, a change which coincided with the rise of technocracy and what James Burnham called the “managerial revolution.” As managers, understood in broad terms that transcended design, architects re-fashioned themselves in their clients’ image. The move allowed them to imagine themselves as managers of the building trades and as consultants in taste who handled the swelling literature of the building industry. Simultaneously, they sought a leading place within the design bureaus of the expanding government and corporate bureaucracies—another role that combined design and management.

In a mature consumer culture, where products offer a kind of therapeutic adjustment to the crisis of cultural authority, product and person become inextricably bound together—a relationship that brings home the unsettling quality of the famous image of architects dressed up as their buildings at the Beaux-Arts Ball in 1931 (Figure 4). That carnivalesque ball allowed the otherwise sober professionals to act out the ambiguous identity that unnerved the
profession at that moment: namely, as designers who were being asked to serve simultaneously as products and salesmen—here with deadpan faces and paralyzed bodies standing more stiffly than the cumbersome costumes demanded. Behind the caricatures of their mostly Art Deco buildings lay corporate alter egos—only Joseph Freedlander, dressed as the Museum of the City of New York, represents art as art. In other words, behind the artist-architect lay an emerging but still poorly defined architectural figure, one who was negotiating the changing economic order. The consumer, identified through consumer choices, and the architect, who is one of those choices (and, as a member of the same class as the client), talked out their professional, economic, and existential quandaries through the language of goods, including buildings.

Adding to this dilemma was the fact that the profession had never secured a legislative monopoly. As one AIA bureaucrat ruefully stated, “It would appear that architects have hesitated to follow the lead of the doctors and the lawyers who have so thoroughly convinced the public—first, that their services were indispensable and, second, that in the public interest the armor of legislation should protect the furnishing of their services and exclude from practice the quacks and shysters.” The effect on the architectural consumer was profound, for everyone on some level is an arbiter of architecture, judging it on functional if not aesthetic grounds. Who is not competent to evaluate buildings that hide their entrances, or worse, their bathrooms? In this way, architecture has been more like a craft or trade, which offers a product whose value is self-evident, than a profession, whose members often develop a mysteriously complex language to interpret the value of their work to the public and to protect their own professional boundaries. Professional symbols, epitomized by the doctor’s caduceus, which evokes an ancient and mystical sense of healing, clarifies the role of a profession to the public, no matter how distant they are from the reality of practice. Architecture, mired in unresolved codes of professionalism and models of practice, struggled to cultivate the sort of emblem that could front a public relations campaign.

Architecture’s uncertain status in the period—somewhere between a profession and a trade—explains why architects hybridized archetypes, taking on the role of artist or craftsman, engineer or technician, doctor or scientist, manager and businessman. A 1938 advertisement by Libbey Owens Ford Glass Company tried to pinpoint this otherwise ambiguous relationship, calling the architect a “Doctor of Better Living” (Figure 5). The glass company did what the architect could not: advertise the importance of architectural services. The architect-doctor holds his stethoscope to the hearth of the house (as opposed to the heart of the patient), thereby substituting the accessible metaphor of diagnosis and treatment for the more ambiguous role of the architect in designing a house. As he examines the model of the house, the building becomes both a product that fits in the hand, as well as a patient, one accessed, the ad tells us, by studying the needs of the family. Such metaphors protected professional territory, asserting value without divulging special knowledge. The metaphor smoothed over a fundamental contradiction: it explained the profession’s function and mystified its knowledge or work. The comparison to medicine would have been useful for an insecure profession like architecture, whose own advertising policies rendered it mute.

While companies like the Libbey Owens Ford Glass Company could trumpet the work of the architect, architects themselves could not, especially individual practitioners. The AIA struggled to police the increasingly vague boundaries between architecture and consumer culture. In July 1940,
the AIA's board of directors officially censured George Wellington Stoddard, a noted Seattle architect, for “sanctioning an illustrated publication of his work, paid for by advertising solicited from contractors, landscape architects, interior decorators, sub-contractors and material dealers who had cooperated in the execution of the work illustrated” (Figure 6). The offending material was the July 1939 issue of Architecture and Design, a monthly monograph that featured the work of a single architect. Glossy and well illustrated, the publication was sufficiently ambiguous to confuse architects. Each month, a portfolio of the architect’s work was followed by advertisements from contractors and manufacturers who had been involved with the buildings in the previous pages (Figures 7, 8). In Milman and Morphett’s monograph of December 1937, for example, their bathhouse for M. N. Rothschild in Glencoe, Illinois, appears first in the portfolio and then in an ad for the Ludovici-Celadon Company.

Just months before Stoddard’s case, J. P. B. Sinkler, a member of the AIA’s Committee on Professional Conduct, wrote to Albert Harkness, a member of the Judicial Committee, imploring his members to clarify the rules on advertising. The fact that John Russell Pope, Sloan and Robertson, Rapp and Rapp, and a host of other “members of the highest standing in the profession” had published their work in Architecture and Design, Sinkler reasoned, “indicates that the subject is not understood by members of the highest standing in the profession.” In its defense, the publication compared itself to Architectural Record, but the Judicial Committee noted that Architecture and Design contained no “architectural news” and had little of general value to the profession. In Stoddard’s case, the Judicial Committee argued that a magazine like the Record “is not published to advertise that architect, but to inform the reader by showing examples of [his] work.” By contrast, Architecture and Design was clearly a commercial concern. “Now the kernel has been reached,” the committee charged: “This “magazine” is not a general news publication, it is a Brochure or Monograph designed to advertise an individual architect and paid for by others than himself and he is given, for free distribution, 500 copies of a really handsome presentation of his work. He would not and could not publish such a Brochure himself and have it paid for by the advertisers who take space in it, without flagrantly transgressing the Principles of Practice.” The report considered Architecture and Design an attempt to “intrigue or coerce the architect into unwittingly [falling] for allurements which lead him out of the paths of righteousness.” Such biblical language demonstrates the larger aura of morality that surrounded the letter of the code.

Stoddard’s apology to the board of directors summed up the ambiguities and tensions surrounding publicity in the profession: “I undoubtedly committed a grave error, for which I am deeply sorry,” he wrote. “There are times in every man’s life when he does things on the spur of the moment that he later regrets. This was one of those decisions. The humiliation of a three month’s suspension, together with the notoriety attached hereto, is a penalty I would do a great deal to avoid.” But Stoddard did not go down without protest: “My past record and the conduct of my practice does not warrant such treatment,” especially given the fact, he added, that many other architects had done the same thing. And indeed they had. Architecture and Design had published the work of both famous and less-known architects from every region, generation, and of every stylistic inclination—and they had been doing so for over two decades, often with much less restrained advertising than the single page in the issue devoted to Stoddard (Figure 9). The list of contractors, landscape architects, and interior decorators who participated in his work appeared just after the title page, suggesting that it was a list of acknowledgments rather than advertisements.
Figure 7 Advertisement for A. W. Lane Contractors and Ludovici-Celadon Company (from Architecture and Design 1, no. 3 [Dec. 1937], unpaginated, courtesy of Special Collections, Environmental Design Library, U.C. Berkeley)

Figure 8 Milman and Morphett, Pool Pavilion for M. N. Rothschild, Glencoe, Illinois (from Architecture and Design 1, no. 3 [Dec. 1937], unpaginated, courtesy of Special Collections, Environmental Design Library, U.C. Berkeley)
advertising and public relations. The first was a direct appeal, usually intended to sell something specific, while the second was a broader effort to create a favorable opinion of something, whether it be a corporate reputation or, in the case of architecture, of an entire profession. While architects needed public relations to improve the perception and standing of the profession, their prohibition of advertising impinged on their ability to take its close cousin, public relations, seriously. Both commended “publicity of the standards, aims and progress of the profession,” drawing an important distinction between individual advertising and publicity for the profession. The Institute represented the first as a rogue activity that celebrated the individual while introducing unwanted competitive practices. The latter, by contrast, was a laudable collective effort to increase the stature of the profession in the eyes of the public. They thus observed a common division between advertising and public relations. The first was a direct appeal, usually intended to sell something specific, while the second was a broader effort to create a favorable opinion of something, whether it be a corporate reputation or, in the case of architecture, of an entire profession. While architects needed public relations to improve the perception and standing of the profession, their prohibition of advertising impinged on their ability to take its close cousin, public relations, seriously. Both
suffered from associations with the sort of self-promotion deemed unsuitable to a dignified profession.

In 1940, just as Stoddard’s case was being decided, debates erupted in the AIA that drew the stark difference between individual advertising and professional publicity into question. In correspondence to the officers of the Institute, in internal memos and meetings, and in the pages of the *Octagon*, public relations and advertising emerge as perhaps the most important professional issue, so much so that *Architectural Record* asserted: “public relations will be topic number one when architects get together in 1940.” Edwin Bergstrom, the president of the AIA, addressed the matter in the *Octagon* before the annual conference, continuing to warn the individual architect against “obtrusive and ostentatious” publicity. Such personal publicity leaves “the public with the impression that the architect is conducting a commercial enterprise in a commercial manner and not a professional office.” Commercialism, he continued, “leads the public naturally to expect the architects to compete with each other on the commercial basis of sketches, drawings, and fees.” Competition threatened a cardinal virtue of professional practice, the fixed fee schedule; Bergstrom then ventured into the more complicated arrangements between advertisers and architects. It was common practice for magazines and manufacturers to illustrate the work of architects in advertisements and publicity materials, offering public exposure that freed them from both the expense and the indignity of having to pitch themselves directly. However, the AIA consistently frowned upon this oblique form of publicity, on the grounds that it, too, was “inimical to the best interests of the architectural profession” because, as Bergstrom put it, “adverse implications . . . are unavoidable.”

Bergstrom’s vague language reveals just how wide a blanket the AIA felt it needed to throw over the issue, covering up even “the appearance of . . . obligation” to commercial interests: “[The architect] is not maintaining the integrity of his position if he permits the publication of his work in a publication which uses that work or his name or influence as a basis for securing paid advertising from the manufacturers, dealers, or contractors who furnish labor or materials for the work illustrated or described, nor is he relieved of responsibility for violating his professional integrity by attempting to divide that responsibility with the publisher.” The ethical concern arose simultaneously with the increasing dependence of magazines on advertising revenue in the first decades of the twentieth century. By the 1940s, the nexus between manufacturers, architects, and the architectural press had become much more than a mere byproduct of consumer culture: it was an essential part of the building industry. In an anonymous, national market, ads informed architects about materials and new research and provided manufacturers with an outlet for direct publicity.

In addition to Stoddard’s case, advertisements in 1939 and 1940 may have provoked Bergstrom to speak out on the issue, as advertisers used buildings from the New York World’s Fair in a barrage of publicity that tied architects, building materials, and advertising concerns into a neat knot of complicity. One advertisement of 1939 for Douglas Fir Plywood, for instance, used A. Lawrence Kocher’s Plywood House from the Town of Tomorrow at the fair, alongside a photograph of the architect, who gave a testimonial (Figure 10). The ad informed the reader that his word “carries real weight because Mr. Kocher is a former editor of *Architectural Record.*” House, product, and architect were pressed together into the tight composition of the page. The ad was part of a series that included Richard Neutra, William Wurster, and Stoddard, all providing expert witness for the virtues of plywood. As architects worked more closely with manufacturers, the barriers between professional and commercial practices eroded faster than the AIA could bolster them.

At the annual conference in May 1940, Bergstrom re-framed the issue in terms of the image of the architect. “The contrasting attitudes of business and of a profession,” he started, “are expressed quite completely when the business man refers to his competitors and the architect refers to his confreres.” Using the French word recalled the shared Beaux-Arts experience of the atelier and the solidarity among architects as they collaborated on a competition, rather than being in competition. However, the culture of the atelier, which still molded much of the character of the architectural office, was under pressure. Architecture, Bergstrom argued, was especially vulnerable to business. Manufacturers and large corporations subsumed architectural services, employing architects but making them subservient to commercial interests and removing them from private practice. This changed the culture of architectural practice considerably. “We must decide,” Bergstrom concluded, “whether we who practice architecture are to act as competitors or as confreres.”

No matter how hard the AIA attempted to separate public relations, advertising, and public information, by the early 1940s, the realities of practice and publicity had made them into one issue. Bergstrom conceded that personal and group publicity, as he called them, “are hardly distinguishable,” and he rejected paid publicity for the profession as a whole on the same ethical grounds that he rejected personal advertising. While he supported the use of journalistic public information, he also acknowledged the increasing pressure from the ranks of the profession for a collective public relations campaign, pressure that came with particular insistence “on the part of the younger architects.”
generational divide also manifested itself in the consideration of professional ethics and consumer culture. Those architects who came of age during the Great Depression or who were exposed to the ideals of European Modernism were less concerned with the dangers of advertising and publicity. Many had already scuttled through economic hardship by working in industry, and others turned the long-standing ethical hesitation over commercial “contamination” into a positive ethos of transforming the world through that very association. Nonetheless, in December 1940, the AIA administration reaffirmed the old “Canon of Ethics,” which prohibited both direct and indirect advertising. This squelched the movement for a paid public relations campaign on the part of the entire profession.

Bergstrom’s views did not represent the will of the profession. In direct contradiction to the AIA president, Royal Barry Wills, who popularized the Cape Cod house, promoted a model of the architect as businessman in his book *This Business of Architecture* of 1941 (Figure 11). One scarcely needed to look beyond the cover, with a dollar sign crossing a T-square, evocative of the caduceus, to get the idea. The pragmatic Wills wrote:

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**Figure 10** Advertisement for Douglas Fir Plywood (from Architectural Forum 70, no. 6 [June 1939], 88)
Now the changing world has banished iron-clad traditionalism and introduced to the architect a host of competitors in the realm of pure and impure business. Because of sacrosanct decades of defenseless immunity his back is more nearly to the wall than he realizes, but he has the best of arguments for his continued existence will he but galvanize himself into an intelligent aggressiveness. Architecture has become, for all practical purposes, a business which retains professional supervision as its inheritance from earlier years, and the modern client’s confidence in the architect is the greater for knowing him to be a businesslike individual.64

Architects lacked the “intelligent aggressiveness” to capitalize on their felicitous placement at the center of the building industries—among the nation’s largest. Wills named one of the fundamental dilemmas of architecture in 1941: while architects found advertising distasteful and unprofessional, businessmen exalted it. Ads were part of an integrated system of communication on which business staked its success. The architect would have to reconcile the dignity of his artistic and professional ideals with the forces of publicity that his clients and competitors had mastered.65

Most architects, however, remained skeptical about Wills’s business-minded architect, supporting outdated conceptions of public relations and advertising as information. Both Architectural Record and Pencil Points reinforced the Institute’s traditionalism. In 1941 Architectural Record started a section called “Architecture Meets Advertising,” edited by Ronald Allwork, which explored the relationship between the two fields and provided a forum for architects to comment on it (Figure 12). Alden B. Dow, one of the better-known architects to weigh in, wrote of his “annoyance” when “advertisements were mixed up with the body of the magazine,” a standard practice for decades.66 Dow’s interest in segregating advertising and editorial content came out of a belief in their fundamental difference and a desire to avoid the ads. Magazines, however, were committed to interleafing the two because advertising rates were set according to placement. But the Record editors explicitly advocated making advertising content more like editorial content, using these precise terms as a means of equating their value. Advertising, they maintained, was a form of objective information essential for architects.67 As architect Jule Robert Von Sternberg wrote in a letter to the Record: “I dislike advertising that is all cheese cake and no data.”68 Allwork’s mock advertisement on the same page demonstrated how the ad could become informative by foregrounding a product’s cost, performance, application, and appearance. To underscore his intentions, in the lower right corner, where one might expect to find an offer for a pamphlet or catalogue, is an area simply called “FACTS.” Here was the idea of public information championed originally in 1918 by James Grady, the AIA’s publicist, now transformed into advertising some two decades later.

Pencil Points also took up the cause of professional publicity. D. Knickerbacker Boyd, the head of the AIA’s Public Information Committee during the First World War, wrote a regular section called “Public Relations” in the magazine in 1940 and 1941, but he failed to inspire new methods for the profession.69 Charles Magruder, managing editor at the magazine, painted a dire picture of the situation as war shifted the terms of the debate. In June 1941, he wrote: “It seems curious when vast sums of cash, energy, and impatience are being spent right in his own province, that we have not heard the Architect’s orders shouted above all others.” Everyone is “tuned to the hum of industry” preparing for war, he wrote: “We haven’t been fooled when we see splashed across newspapers and magazines such familiar banners as BLUEPRINTS FOR POWER or DESIGN FOR DEFENSE or PLAN BIGGER INDUSTRIAL PLANT. It is no use to say smugly, ‘Ha! The Architects are at it again,’ They are not.” According to Magruder, architects were being outmaneuvered:
Those words were stolen in broad daylight from the Architect’s vocabulary, either by an uncaring headwriter who wanted to inspire public confidence in what is being done or by those who would supplant the Architect in our vital Defense Program. It is not the first time the profession has been robbed; but it could be the last time! Jobs have been snatched from the Architect’s own drafting-board by enemies with no more powerful Secret Weapon than a loud voice. The rival Engineers have team-chanted “We Are Efficient” until they believe it themselves. The Industrial Designers, some of them as skilled in design as they are forward in business, have sometimes brandished the work of architectural men they employ, to win jobs and confidence away from Architects.70

To this, he added the most recent threat: “We may yet hear the Trained Planner directing those diggers and riveters.”71

Architects, according to Magruder and other writers in the architectural press, believed that they were losing a war of public relations against enemies whose only superior trait was better press.

In late 1941 scandal presented a new opportunity. Edwin Bergstrom left the presidency of the AIA under a cloud of embezzlement charges. He moved to the larger, richer bureaucracy of the federal government, appointed to design the Pentagon for the War Department.72 Richmond H. Shreve (1877–1946) replaced Bergstrom, who had practiced mainly in Los Angeles. The new president represented the East Coast business elite. The highlights of his client list read like a who’s who of American business: Met Life Insurance Company, Johns-Manville Corporation, Standard Oil, General Motors, and R.J. Reynolds, not to

Figure 12 “Architecture Meets Advertising” (from Architectural Record 89, no. 4 [April 1941], 105)
mention his work with Lamb and Harmon on the Empire State Building, itself a formidable icon of corporate America. For good measure, he also designed the New York Times headquarters, completing his engagement with the nexus between big business, architecture, and the media. Shreve brought with him a sympathetic view of business and the media, a view he won not solely through these high-profile corporate commissions, but also through his experience in the office of Carrère and Hastings. As Mary N. Woods has shown, John Carrère stood at the forefront of architects in the early twentieth century who “emulated the specialization and bureaucratization of American business conglomerates.”73 Shreve only joined the firm in 1920, in the faded glory of its final years, but he would have seen its prodigious business organization function in both the depression after World War I and the bubbling economy of the 1920s.74

A series of advertisements for Alexander Smith and Sons Carpet Company would immediately test Shreve’s direction. The ads, which had been running sporadically since 1939, featured noted architects’ testimonials. One month, Harvey Wiley Corbett intently stared at a carpet sample and claimed: “the success of a building . . . and the professional progress of the architect who designed it are usually based less on the impressiveness of the shell than on the satisfaction engendered by the use of the interior spaces” (Figure 13).75 The implied slogan was that the carpet makes the room, paraphrasing the cliché that the suit makes the man; in this

Figure 13 Advertisement for Alexander Smith and Sons Carpet Company (from Architectural Record 85, no. 6 [June 1939], third cover)
instance, the carpet also made the architect because it ensured his professional progress. Ely Jacques Kahn and a host of lesser-known architects also contributed to the series. These innocuous advertisements violated both the letter and the spirit of the AIA’s code of conduct by linking an architect with a product specified in his designs, thereby casting his impartiality in doubt. The ads placed the architect in the compromising position of being the pitchman for a commercial concern. Adding to the controversy, many were not anonymous architects at the periphery of the profession, but well-known practitioners and important representatives of the AIA itself, such as William Lescaze, who headed the New York Chapters Committee on Public Relations (Figure 14).

Both Corbett and Lescaze are depicted leaning over their drafting tables, studying carpet samples as intently as they might their own designs. The pencil and triangle on Lescaze’s desk remind us that the same hands that hold the carpet also design buildings, like the one to which the corners of both the triangle and carpet sample point. The composition follows the traditions of architect’s portraits, in which the architect poses as if at work with the tools of his
trade at hand, with an image of one of his celebrated buildings looming behind him. The pictorial convention reduces the strangeness of Lescaze clutching his carpet sample, which becomes paired with his “great work” beyond. In this case it is a rendering of the Longfellow Building (1939–41), a high-profile commission in Washington, D.C., which Lescaze was busy reworking at the time. A direct connection is thus drawn between the architect, his design, and consumption, which the image makes indivisible. Lescaze has just put down his pencil on a blueprint and examines the carpet, as if it could influence his next stroke—or perhaps replace the pencil entirely. Consumption has become design, or at least an integral part of it. The other ads in the Alexander Carpet series followed this pattern. They were composed to use the authority of the architect to sell the product, but simultaneously they made an argument about the relationship of the architect to the product, one that the AIA could no longer ignore.

When the Alexander Smith Carpet ads were brought up in 1941 as ethics violations of AIA policy, Shreve immediately emended the code. While they violated the Institute’s prohibition against an architect allowing “a photograph of himself to be used in any advertisement of a manufacturer or purveyor of building materials or building services,” Shreve clearly thought that the rule had outlived its usefulness. Shreve must have shrunken from the prospect of reprimanding well-known colleagues, including Lescaze, Corbett, and Kahn. (Shreve had collaborated closely with Lescaze on the well-known Williamsburg Houses in Brooklyn in 1937.)

Throughout 1942 the AIA president continued to relax the rules on advertising, rewording AIA policy to condemn “inclusion of photographs of architects in advertisements of building products,” without forbidding it, calling it “undesirable, but . . . not the subject of disciplinary action.” Shreve immediately emended the code. While they violated the Institute’s prohibition against an architect allowing “a photograph of himself to be used in any advertisement of a manufacturer or purveyor of building materials or building services,” Shreve clearly thought that the rule had outlived its usefulness. Shreve must have shrunken from the prospect of reprimanding well-known colleagues, including Lescaze, Corbett, and Kahn. (Shreve had collaborated closely with Lescaze on the well-known Williamsburg Houses in Brooklyn in 1937.)

The architect is asked to connive in this grandiose arrangement. He is pointedly threatened with complete and utter extinction, if he does not choose complacency to play a minor part in this vast merchandising and sales organization. The old professional relationship between Architect and client is to be swept away. The idea has worked well in the ready-to-wear clothing industry. The American public buys packaged goods of all sorts. We have proprietary medicinal products, why not proprietary Building (or Architectural) products? Why indeed not packaged Sculpture, packaged Painting? We are on the march toward a higher, finer, richer civilization. So say the Editors of our Architectural Press, so say the Exponents of the new ideology.

Le Baume seeded his argument with the rhetoric of the day: “The total blackout of our most precious ideal can happen here—is happening here,” he wrote, linking the language of war (“blackout”) and fascism (“it can happen here”) with the moral dilemma that advertising posed for art. Nonetheless, Le Baume cast his sarcasm aside and supported Hughes’s suggestions, calling for the expansion of the Octagon magazine to embrace the whole profession, and to fund it by running advertising in its pages. Le Baume, celebrated for his buildings at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition in St. Louis in 1904, secretely had been an exponent of the new ideology for years. His own monograph appeared in Architecture and Design in 1927—the year the AIA passed its Code of Ethics.

Even as the AIA debated these issues, several corporations launched advertising campaigns that took advantage of the loosening strictures under Shreve. Between 1941 and 1945, architects eagerly participated in campaigns by United States Gypsum Company (USG), Revere Copper and Brass,
Pittsburgh Plate Glass, Barrett Roofs, General Electric, Celotex, and Monsanto, all of which positioned the architect as an expert. In these ads, architects worked for the first time in a sustained manner with admen, who weaved their ideas for postwar architecture into propagandistic wartime advertisements that prepared the public for postwar consumption—in particular, for the anticipated building boom. While they still remained several steps away from using advertising directly for self-promotion, they found themselves moving in new circles, their photographs and designs circulated in new contexts.

The USG ads, arguably the most elaborate of them all, played on the connections between advertising, architecture, and the architectural press. Beginning in March 1941 and lasting through most of 1942, the company’s ads featured original designs by well-known progressive architects such as Edward Durrell Stone, George Fred Keck, Eero Saarinen, Gardner A. Dailey; and Perkins, Wheeler and Will. Their projects, all unbuilt, ranged from topical programs, such as defense and wartime housing, to explorations of evolving building types such as the community center or supermarket.

Dailey’s supermarket provides a sense of the spirit of engagement of the series (Figure 15). Dailey, a Bay Area modernist best known in the 1930s for his houses, proposed a supermarket as the social and commercial nucleus for suburban developments, such as the new California communities.

Figure 15  Gardner A. Dailey, Advertisement for USG (from Architectural Forum 75, no. 1 [July 1941], 84, by permission of the Environmental Design Archives, U.C. Berkeley)
then forming. It would play a role much like that of the marketplace of so many European and Latin-American cities and towns. In separating the two words, “super” and “market,” the ad both revealed the unsettled status of this building type and drew attention to the market as a communal experience. Dailey designed it to bind together the atomized automobile culture then taking shape, mirroring in its long horizontal spread the horizontal culture that would spill out of cities in the decades after the war (Figure 16).

The program and plan reveal that this supermarket was a cultural as well as an architectural change. Dailey wrote that in some new subdivisions, markets were opened at important intersections before secondary streets were even paved, making it among those indispensable institutions at the heart of the California culture. He surrounded the market with a liquor store, drug store, delicatessen, and restaurant so that they might stay open all night. What appeared to be an indulgence would be necessary, he believed, for the burgeoning postwar communities of California. The supermarket, like the later shopping mall, came with utopian hope. It promised to serve as a community center, a necessary place for bringing people together in the increasingly far-flung world of suburbs and automobiles. The plan shows what Dailey called the “all-inclusive market” of the “self-help controlled type,” a “Food Department Store” set up as a “shopping island” that eased access for the automobile outside and
provided flexibility and unrestricted flow for foot traffic inside. All of the functions—different types of marketing, but also stocking, accounting, and promotion—were treated not unlike urban zoning, each carefully segregated and treated differently in plan, creating a “super business calling for super management” that would displace not only the corner grocery but also “the outmoded chain store.”

The advertisement explored architectural and social ideas and established only a vague connection between the content and the company that paid for it. The last page in these multiple-page ads, like that of a trade catalog, provided specifications for the company’s materials, but the series was of sufficient interest (or its sponsor was well enough hidden) that several were indexed in the Avery Index to Architectural Periodicals as if they were articles. In fact, the company’s ads paraded as news stories, even emulating the graphic layout and informational bias of articles, thus fulfilling the Record’s interest in “advertising content.” The architect-experts had become pitchmen, endorsing products, but, as advocates of public information had hoped, the building industry now blanketed the public with advertising that served the architectural profession, overshadowing the nominal public relations efforts of the AIA. The taboo had been broken.

Ads like those published by USG during the war suggest that the basis of professionalism and practice had shifted. Architects now served as much as consumer advocates, as they did designers or managers (Figure 17). In an ad for Edwards Signaling of 1944, a frustrated family sits on its mound of clippings and teardrums as a large, benign spirit of an architect magically makes sense of their mess with his pencil. He obviously is the one who “. . . is going to put it all together,” as the ad queries. Yet this is not the only thing that the architect has put together. The head-scratching head of family leans back in partial resignation and meets the head of the architect, who gently takes control, extending rather than displacing his authority. At the same time, the architect reaches between husband and wife and with his pencil nearly meets the outstretched hand of the woman, who actively leans into the work. The architect has become a mediator between husband and wife, a gesture of particular poignancy on the home front, when many couples endured long separations. The architect becomes a symbol of the restoration of family. Gendering the head masculine and the hand feminine reinforced some of the stereotypical associations of design with the masculine and consumption with the feminine. Design, while far from dead, was now patterned as much by products as by pencils, and this demanded a reconciliation of these stereotypes.

While advertisements pushed the AIA’s boundaries, some architects sought to reform practice and official policy to accommodate the changes brought on by the war. Anticipating the bleak prospects of the architect in wartime prompted a withering assessment of the profession’s relationship to modern forms of publicity. Hal Burnett, a trained architect who went on to become a publicist, most prominently at the Century of Progress Exposition in Chicago—and whose firm represented Holabird and Root, Perkins, Wheeler and Will, Pereira and Pereira, and other Chicago architects—likened the architectural profession to the conquered nations of Europe: “totally unprepared to meet and master the various streamlined, panzer-like movements that have rolled in to capture the cream of building profits.”

Burnett cited the “popular sport” among architects of damning their competitors, the “super-enemies” of the architectural profession: “The architects say, ‘Start a boycott. . . . Somebody ought to pass a law . . . ’ But eventually the fire burns low, the last Scotch is drained, and once again the average architect slips back into slumber . . . lulled to complacency behind a Maginot line of tradition.” Burnett warned: “Few are the architects who realize that the business world—especially the selling and advertising fields they so carefully avoid—has in the last decade undergone a revolution” in sales promotion, public relations, and consumer education, “that has armed the industrial designer, the jerry builder, the engineer-contractor, and the stock-plan peddler to snare the architect’s building dollar so successfully.”

Indeed, for decades, admen had addressed the problem of selling indistinguishable products by deflecting attention away from the material fact of the product to its intangible benefits. The technique found full expression in the 1920s, when, for instance, toothpaste did not merely clean teeth, it guaranteed success; the right whiskey won the account; laundry detergent promised familial harmony; and the best appliances and architectural supplies led to better living. In the 1930s, admen cast aside the retrenchment of the “truth in advertising” campaigns of the early twentieth century, and returned part way to the tone of advertising’s snake-oil days of the nineteenth century. Straightforward, text-heavy ads declined, and parables, tableaux, and eye-catching graphics and fonts turned the pages of magazines into a spectacle of selling. These techniques led to what advertising historian Roland Marchand described as “busy, cluttered pages,” the dwindling white space filled with “more graphic, hardboiled advertising copy,” and a willfully ugly aesthetic aimed at attracting attention. By the 1940s, these techniques were ubiquitous. Thus, as architects insisted on public information and news as the basis of promoting the profession, advertising had embraced more atmospheric modes of selling.

Like Royal Barry Wills, Burnett urged architects to undertake “an ethical but militant” program to build public...
confidence: “A Gallup, a Starch, a Roper, or a Nielson should turn the spotlight of public opinion on every phase of architectural practice.” Architects also had to alter standards of practice to allow forbidden forms of publicity: “There is nothing wrong with group publicity,” he wrote, even suggesting that “bars against publicity for the work of individual firms should be relaxed. For every picture, every story publicizing the work of individuals can, if intelligently and honestly handled, benefit the profession, as well as the public.”

Some AIA officials took note. In its report to the annual AIA convention in 1942, the Committee on Architectural Service warned: “The impact of war on building has made our profession a major casualty. Whether we remain a casualty to be buried without military honors and mourned only by antiquarians, or whether our wounds can be healed and we can live to fight another day depends chiefly on ourselves.” The issue, in their minds, came down to finding the right model for the architect. Referencing Vitruvius, the committee fell back on the most traditional of formulas:

Well building hath three conditions, commodity, firmness, and delight. From time to time waves sweep the profession emphasizing one or another of these conditions at the expense of the others. There have been times when the architect had to be...
primarily an artist, others when he was to be a businessman, now he must be an engineer. It is not hard to discover the reasons for this shift of emphasis. They are always plausible, but they have always led the architect after false gods. There is only one god for the architect and he is a trinity, each part coequal with each.102

The architect had to seize control of the Vitruvian trinity by “leading, and serving, and being a champion.” This, in turn, required a new public profile. “A staggering army of witnesses testifies to the complete misconception of the function of the architect held by those in authority over the prosecution of the war.”103

In order to correct this misconception, architects, the report asserted, would have to adopt a new model and command the field of planning because this, they reasoned, would be essential for wartime and postwar planning:

Our function as planners is often usurped by others who have invented a new terminology. One perfectly competent and practical architect denied being a site-planner because he thought it was some new science. Being a sober fellow more devoted to good work than good bally-hoo, he failed to realize that locating a house well on a lot is site-planning.104

Sympathetic to the plight of the serious architect who was so naive to the workings of salesmanship that he did not even know he was a planner, the authors ended with a manifesto: “We need planning now. . . . This is a job for architects and we know he was a planner, the authors ended with a manifesto: “We need planning now. . . . This is a job for architects and architects of all people should take the lead in advocating planning now.” Public relations and a professional shift in emphasis to planning were thus intertwined in the strained logic of home-front practice. All the architects not absorbed by the war effort “should be put to work planning,” the report concluded.105

What planning constituted remained vague, however, making it a difficult product to pitch, even if many architects saw it as their natural domain. For twentieth-century architects, planning had many roots, one of the most prominent being the emphasis on the plan in the teaching of the Ecole des Beaux-Arts. But planning also evoked the rise of technocracy and the architect’s role in the expanding bureaucracies of the federal government under the New Deal. The ambiguity of planning could thus simultaneously embrace multiple models of practice. Hence the replacement of the engineer by the planner in wartime debates about professional identity.

Whichever model architects put forward, lack of funding posed the true impediment to successful public relations. In the early 1940s, architects were splintered into dozens of local and state associations, and while a fledgling movement for their unification was taking hold, American architects remained organizationally fragmented. In fact, the national AIA represented scarcely one-fifth of the architects practicing in the country.106 This minority failed to contribute the dues necessary to run a major national organization, and without a strong claim to guardianship of the profession, the AIA languished. In fact, the funding problem grew so acute that the AIA terminated James T. Grady’s contract in March 1942 on account of insufficient funds.107 Although he was rehired in time to do publicity for its 1943 convention in Cincinnati, the Institute faltered at the exact moment of the profession’s greatest need, with architects scrambling to stay afloat during the war and uncertain of the role that they would play in the widely anticipated postwar building boom.

By early 1943, the Committee on Public Information, now free to explore advertising unhindered by ethical concerns, proposed the “reversal of a long established Institute policy which excludes advertising from the pages of the Octagon.”108 By elevating the Octagon from little more than a newsletter to a magazine that could compete with Architectural Forum, Pencil Points, and Architectural Record, the Institute would create a de facto organ of public relations. Under Henry Saylor, the new journal, the Journal of the Institute of Architects, called itself “a broadcasting system operating on the wavelength of the Voice of the profession” that would “amplify it to audibility.”109 Under Saylor, it began accepting ads, but not quickly enough for the impatient rank and file. One irate architect, who was in favor of a fully commercial, professional magazine, complained:

This A.I.A. of which I am so boosted in vainglory—they do, after all lean backwards. Their belly is in a terrible strain (for money to operate with) and their backs in compression, on account of the burden they carry. But, why in the hell can’t we circulate our own corporate members (it might be beneath the dignity of the Fellows) when these damned impertinent inquiries come to them, asking what magazine they read most, that they write: Journal of the American Institute of ARCHITECTS . . . . Here we are: carry only 6 pages of ads. We should carry 60 pages. And we could, and we would IF we would take that stretch out of our belly and not pose as Nth degree aesthetes.110

The outmoded ethics that precluded advertising were now associated with the outdated model of the artist-architect.

The Committee’s report in 1943 no longer cobbled together voluntary publicity efforts—the usual AIA strategy—, acknowledging that campaigns that “put the initiative solely on the individual members” repeatedly failed. Instead, they proposed that the AIA launch a national, paid public relations campaign that departed from James T. Grady’s strictly journalistic model. Citing the advertising in the Journal of the
James T. Grady retired as the organization’s publicist at the end of the war. The static, news-based campaigns maintained by him and the AIA in the 1930s and 1940s could not compete with the advertising and public relations campaigns of that day. While many architects agitated for change, the Institute was slow to grasp the realities of modern practice. Not only had it chosen poorly when it advocated information over advertising, but also, in Grady, it had chosen the wrong breed of journalist. While he was considered a pioneer of science reporting who represented the achievements of technical societies well, his efforts to publicize the more complicated architectural profession fell short.113

Grady’s immediate successors fared no better. The Institute hired the Campell-Ewald Company in late 1945 to run its PR effort. On the face of it, the choice was smart and bold. Campell-Ewald had created the wartime ad campaign for Stran-Steel, the manufacturers of the Quonset hut. Their ads included publicity for the company’s wartime venture in urban planning a satellite city outside of Detroit for which Stran-Steel hired Smith, Hinchman and Grylls, a major local firm, as designers.114 This venture drew attention from Architectural Forum, which featured the project in its issue of October 1943 on the “Planned Neighborhood for 194X.” Editorial and advertising content were now in lockstep. The firm’s program for the AIA went poorly, however, and the Institute rejected the inadequate press releases prepared for its annual convention in 1946.115 Local chapters complained to the national office about the dearth of publicity, and the Committee on Public Relations, which found Campell-Ewald’s methods “fraught with difficulties” and “of questionable value,” fired the firm.116 The Institute, shaken and lacking the confidence to hire another full-fledged public relations counsel, hired Everett B. Wilson Associates in 1946 for a six-month trial period at a mere $250 per month.117 Whereas Campell-Ewald was a leading advertising firm in New York City, Everett B. Wilson Associates represented a variety of business associations in Washington, D.C., making it seem like a more appropriate match for the AIA, whose lobbying function naturally centered on the capital.

AIA unification would eventually provide the economic means to carry out the agenda that the Depression and war had helped forge. The mobilization of architects to serve the home front, in particular, eased the profession’s relationship with consumer culture. The great corporations, which were fundamental to the war effort, led the way with advertisements that were a crucial part of wartime propaganda. With the formation of the Wartime Advertising Council in 1942, advertising became patriotic, and consumption—or planned consumption—became vital for reconstruction and postwar economic health.118 Consumption also took on a new, positive valence with the turn to Keynesian economic theory, which positioned it as the central economic driver. In these changing conditions, the architect who got involved with advertisements was no longer in breach of professional ethics; he was helping the nation stave off a postwar depression. All of this broke down the resistance to advertising. The AIA finally launched a national publicity campaign in the 1950s, after unification of the various local and state chapters created a fully representative body with financial clout.119 This opened the way for both the gigantic, businesslike architectural firms that emerged in the postwar decades and the “starchitect” system of today.

Notes
1. Thanks to Elizabeth Byrne of the Environmental Design Library at U.C. Berkeley, Nancy Hadley of the AIA, Jason Miller, Matico Josephson, Benjamin Friedman, and David Brownlee.
6. See Division of Advertising, Committee on Public Information, Government War Advertising (Washington: The Committee, 1918). For an overview of their work, see James Robert Mock and Cedric Larson, Words that Won the War: The Story of the Committee on Public Information, 1917–1919 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939); also Alan Axelrod, Selling the Great War: The Making of American Propaganda (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 7. In the same spirit, the AIA’s “Better Advertising for Architects” campaign of 1925 attempted to standardize architectural advertising in size and with the “Institute Standard Classification Index Number” so that ads could be more easily filed in architect’s offices. See AIA Archives, Box 131053276, unmarked binder.

Royal Institute of British Architects and Hygeia, the journal of the American Medical Association, the report asserted: “The bugaboo of advertising in a publication owned by the architectural profession fades in the light of value received.”111 The proceeds earned through advertising in the journal, they believed, would allow the Institute to hire a full-time publicist, “the best man available to do for the architectural profession what Dr. Fishbein is doing for the medical profession.”112

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12. The formula, which suggested a more clinical understanding of publicity, originated in publishing, just as the AIA’s task had originated in journalism. The formula was attributed to Richard H. Waldo, publisher of Hearst’s International and a former business manager at Good Housekeeping, who spoke at the conference.
15. Ibid., 24.
16. Ibid., 25, 27.
17. Ibid., 47.
30. Maher, 175.
33. Fox and Lears, The Culture of Consumption, x.
63. For a failed attempt at publicity on the part of the Philadelphia Chapter of the AIA, see Minutes Book of the Philadelphia Chapter of the AIA (10 May 1917). Philadelphia Athenaeum. Also, in 1941 the New York Chapter of AIA formed the committee Profession and Society, which hired a public relations firm to survey the ills of the profession. Pencil Points 22 (May 1941), 45.
64. Letter, Alden B. Dow, Architectural Record (March 1941), 120.
65. They shared this position with Sweet’s Catalog—F. W. Dodge owned both publications—which had long attempted to standardize advertising and to strip it down to a purely informational medium. See Andrew M. Shanken, “From the Gospel of Efficiency to Modernism: A History of Sweet’s Catalog, 1906–1947,” Design Issues 21, no. 2 (Spring, 2005).
69. Ibid.
70. The account of Bergstrom’s wrongdoing comes from various documents in the Archives of the AIA. See, for instance, William Emerson to Charles T. Ingham (28 Nov. 1941), which is a letter of accusation, AIA Archives, box 111028978, folder: Kohn T. Ingham (28 Nov. 1941), 368.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
75. Harvey Wiley Corbett, ad for Alexander Smith Carpet, Architectural Record 85 (June, 1939), third cover.
77. “Board of Directors Minutes Miscellanea 1941–1943,” minutes of 1 July, 1 Aug. 1941, AIA Archives, box 5 RG509 SR2, folder: AIA Board of Directors.
82. Ibid.
83. Louis La Beaume to the board of directors, AIA (10 Nov. 1942), AIA Archives, box 131020354, folder: Policies and National Standing.
84. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. For more on the USG campaign, see Shanken, 194X: 100–111.